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Judicial Jurisdiction: From a
Contacts to an Interest Analysis
Luther L. McDougal III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Soon after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment,' the
United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff2 held that the
due process clause of that amendment s imposed limitations on the
states' authority to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant.4 The Court stated that, with a few exceptions,5 a state
could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when
he was served with process while physically present within the
state, or when he owned property in the state that the court had
seized at the commencement of the action.6 These limitations were
derived from two public law principles of state sovereignty that
* W.R. Irby Professor of Law, Tulane University. B.A., 1959, LL.B., 1962, University
of Mississippi; LL.M., 1966, Yale University.
1. The states ratified the fourteenth amendment in 1868.
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
3. The due process clause provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
lUberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. The facts in Pennoyer arose before the states had ratified the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court relied on the full faith and credit clause to support its decision
that Oregon lacked authority to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. 95
U.S. at 729-30. The Court, however, indicated that the due process clause would be the
important constitutional limitation in the future. Id. at 733-34.
5. These exceptions included voluntary appearance in a case, cases that dealt with the
personal status of a claimant, and cases in which a partriership or association had appointed
an agent for service of process in the state. Id. at 733-35.
6. Id. at 733. There is disagreement over whether the seizure had to be at the com-
mencement of the action or at any time prior to judgment. See Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Pt. 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735, 826
(1981).
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Justice Story had propounded in his treatise on conflict of laws.'
The Court in Pennoyer restated these two principles as follows:
"[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory [and] no State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory."s Thus, from the outset due process protec-
tions were based on a highly territorial conception of the states'
authority.
Because of changing social conditions-including the increased
use of the corporate entity in the business world, the development
of the automobile and other forms of more rapid transportation,
and the invention of far more sophisticated modes of communica-
tion-Pennoyer's territorial view of a state's judicial jurisdiction
soon became unworkable and bore little relation to people's every-
day activities. Rather than abandon Pennoyer's extremely restric-
tive territorial view of jurisdiction, however, the Supreme Court
began formulating a series of legal fictions that expanded the scope
of the states' jurisdiction, but which permitted the Court to stay
within the theoretical confines of the Pennoyer doctrine. 9 The "im-
plied consent" theory, which was applicable to both corporate ac-
tivities10 and nonresident motorists," and the "presence" doctrine,
which applied only to corporate activities, 2 were the most promi-
nent among these fictions. For several decades, these two theories
gave rise to an enormous amount of litigation-litigation that pro-
duced conflicting and confusing decisions.13 To borrow an expres-
sion from Professor Rosenberg, a lawyer trying to predict the out-
come on state judicial jurisdiction questions during these years had
more need of a Ouija board than a Shepard's Citator.
1 4
In 1945 the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington"' finally abandoned these legal fictions and formu-
lated a two-pronged approach to determine whether a state court
constitutionally could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
7. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 (2d ed. 1841).
8. 95 U.S. at 722.
9. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Juris-
diction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla" A Review, 25 U. CH!. L. REV. 569, 573-
74 (1958).
10. For a discussion of this doctrine, see Kurland, supra note 9, at 578-82.
11. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
12. See Kurland, supra note 9, at 582-84.
13. Id. at 574-86.
14. Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (1967).
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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fendant who had neither consented to1" nor acquiesced in17 the
court's jurisdiction over him. The first element of this approach is
the "minimum contacts" standard. The Court stated that "[d]ue
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the ... forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' ,,18 According to the Court, minimum con-
tacts support an exercise of jurisdiction only when the contacts
give rise to the particular controversy.1 9 The Court stated that this
relationship between the defendant's contacts with the state and
the actual controversy is necessary because it demonstrates that
the defendant enjoyed "the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state" when it engaged in its activities; the burden of defend-
ing such an action in the state, therefore, could not be viewed as
overly oppressive.20
The other prong of the International Shoe approach deals
with the situations in which a state may exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant even though the facts engendering the con-
troversy occurred wholly outside the state. Speaking for the Court,
Chief Justice Stone acknowledged that in some situations continu-
ous activity within a state is not enough to subject a corporation to
a state's jurisdiction in a lawsuit that is unrelated to that activity.
21
The Court, however, observed that "there have been instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
16. Consent to a state's judicial jurisdiction presents policy questions that are differ-
ent from those which are discussed herein and, therefore, are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. For a brief and partial identification of the types of policies that are relevant to contro-
versies concerning the defendant's consent to jurisdiction, see notes 172-75 infra and
accompanying text.
17. Although commentators rarely make the distinction between to "consent to" and
to "acquiesce in" jurisdiction, the distinction nevertheless should be made, since the con-
cepts raise differing policy issues. When a defendant, by his words or actions, voluntarily
waives any objections to the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum state, he is said to "con-
sent to" jurisdiction in that state. On the other hand, when a defendant engages in certain
activities within a state, or has some relationship with a state, and the same state asserts
that the defendant thereby has consented to its jurisdiction, the defendant instead is said to
have acquiesced in the state's jurisdiction. Acquiescence statutes are holdovers from the
implied consent theory, which the Supreme Court previously employed, and which may still
apply in limited situations. The Court specifically mentioned this type of statute in Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977). See note 172 infra and accompanying text.
18. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
19: Id. at 317-18.
20. Id. at 319.
21. Id. at 318.
1982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities.
'22
Because the International Shoe opinion addressed in per-
sonam jurisdiction, it was unclear for more than three decades
whether the International Shoe approach also was applicable to in
rem and quasi in rem actions.23 The Supreme Court recently clari-
fied its position on this point by declaring in Shaffer v. Heitner"
that the International Shoe approach is applicable regardless of
how the particular action traditionally would have been character-
ized. The Court's decision in International Shoe, then, with some
possible rare exceptions,2 5 clearly has supplanted Pennoyer's con-
cept of power over person and property with more flexible doc-
trines that expand the states' authority to exercise judicial
jurisdiction.
Even though the Supreme Court has abandoned Pennoyer's
dogma, it has not abandoned totally a territorial view of jurisdic-
tion. The Court itself emphasized the point in Hanson v. Denckla26
when, after briefly describing the historical development of juris-
dictional doctrines, it observed,
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts .... Those restric-
tions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of
the respective States.2
7
The Hanson Court implemented its neo-territorial view of jurisdic-
tion by articulating a limitation on the minimum contacts test.
The Court stated that "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
22. Id.
23. The Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), summarized the
differences between the three traditional categories of types of actions as follows: "A judg-
ment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one person in favor of an-
other. A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A judg-
ment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated property." Id. at
246 n.12.
24. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
25. Professor Leflar observes, "The majority opinion ... expressed some doubts
about ... marginal situations, such as in rem jurisdiction for divorce, cases in which no
other forum is available to the plaintiff and cases in which 'the property is in the State
because of an effort to avoid the owner's obligations.'" R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
§ 24A (3d ed. 1977) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1976)).
26. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
27. Id. at 251.
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privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-
voking the benefits and protections of its laws."2 Two recent deci-
sions highlight the significance of this "purposefully availing" ele-
ment of the minimum contacts standard. In Kulko v. Superior
Court29 the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a defen-
dant who had caused "effects" within the state was subject to ju-
risdiction in that state.30 The Court determined that before a state
court can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the
defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and protections of the forum state's law.31 Two years later in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson'3 2 the Court refused to
equate a defendant's ability to "foresee" the possibility of a suit in
the forum state with the purposefully availing requirement. The
Court stated that the foreseeability of a future suit in the forum
state is relevant only when coupled with a defendant's conduct and
connection with that state.33
Since Shaffer has extended the International Shoe doctrines,
as subsequently modified by Hanson, to almost every exercise of
state jurisdiction'34 one must question both the underlying prem-
ises of the standards and their compatibility with facts as they ex-
ist in society today. Justice Brennan suggests the need for this in-
quiry in his joint dissenting opinion to World-Wide Volkswagen 5
and Rush v. Savchuk.3 e He states that the International Shoe
standards "may already be obsolete as constitutional bounda-
ries."'3 7 Of course, even if the International Shoe standards are ob-
solete, the Supreme Court will not abandon the standards unless it
28. Id. at 253.
29. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
30. Id. at 96-98.
31. Id. at 94. For a more detailed discussion of the Kulko case, see notes 176-80 infra
and accompanying text.
32. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
33. Id. at 297. For further discussion of the World-Wide Volkswagen case, see notes
181-88 infra and accompanying text.
34. The International Shoe test may not extend to a limited number of types of cases.
Whether it applies to admiralty in rem procedures, for example, remains an open question.
For a discussion of the admiralty problem, see Bohman, Applicability of Shaffer to Admi-
ralty In Rem Jurisdiction, 53 TuL. L. REV. 135 (1978); Note, Admiralty-Procedure for
Maritime Attachment Found Unconstitutional, 53 TUL. L. REv. 944 (1979).
35. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-313 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (dissent also applies to Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)).
36. 444 U.S. 320, 333 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissent found at World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-313 (1980)).




has available a viable alternative. Justice Brennan asserts that a
form of interest analysis should be employed to establish the con-
stitutional limits on the states' authority to exercise judicial juris-
diction." His proposal is particularly intriguing because it suggests
that controversies over judicial jurisdiction may be resolved in a
manner similar to the way choice-of-law controversies frequently
are resolved. Choice-of-law controversies, like the jurisdiction is-
sues raised by nonresident defendants, arise when lawsuits concern
either trans-state events or parties from different states.
3
1
A close examination of the developments in these areas reveals
that jurisdictional doctrines and choice-of-law theories have
evolved in a parallel fashion. Justice Story's territorial principles,
which served as the foundation for the Pennoyer jurisdictional ap-
proach, heavily influenced choice-of-law thinking for decades. 40 His
principles form the theoretical underpinnings of the "vested
rights" theory that is incorporated in the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws.41 At about the same time that the Supreme
Court began talking about minimum contacts rather than power
over persons and property in jurisdictional cases, some state courts
were beginning to consider contacts rather than vested rights in
their resolution of choice-of-law controversies.' 2 In the choice-of-
law area, however, commentators soon noted that contacts are rele-
vant only to the extent that they indicate the interests and policies
at stake in a controversy."8 Several courts also recognized the va-
lidity of this observation and began to view choice-of-law questions
38. Id. For a brief discussion of Justice Brennan's form of interest analysis, see note 72
infra and accompanying text.
39. Choice-of-law problems deal with what policy should be applied to resolve a trans-
state controversy. See McDougal, Choice of Law: Prologue to a Viable Interest-Analysis
Theory, 51 TuL. L. REv. 207 (1977). Judicial jurisdiction, on the other hand, is concerned
with whether a particular state possesses the authority to apply policy and resolve the
controversy.
40. See Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred
Years After, 48 HARV. L. REv. 15 (1934).
41. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1934). The basic premise of this the-
ory is that the laws of the state in which certain selected events occurred create and thereby
"vest" all rights that a claimant possesses. Section 332, for example, provides that the laws
of the state in which a contract is made control the rights and obligations that are relevant
to that contract. Id. § 332. The influence of Story's principles are found in several of the
comments to the doctrines set forth in the First Restatement. For example, Comment a to
§ 377 states, "Each state has legislative jurisdiction to determine the legal effect of acts
done or events caused within its territory."
42. See, e.g., Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Auten v. Au-
ten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
43. See, e.g., Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1.
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from the standpoint of a policy or interest analysis rather than
simply a contacts standard.44 In fact, a majority of states now em-
ploy some form of policy or interest analysis in the resolution of
choice-of-law controversies." Jurisdictional doctrines, however,
have not yet evolved from the minimum contacts approach to an
interest analysis. This Article, therefore, examines whether the
courts should shift their focus to a policy or interest analysis in
judicial jurisdiction cases.
The Article initially identifies some of the theoretical inade-
quacies of, and practical difficulties with, the Supreme Court's pur-
posefully availing/minimum contacts approach to jurisdictional
problems.4 The Article then outlines an alternative approach that
employs a comprehensive form of interest analysis. After setting
forth this proposed framework, the Article proceeds to examine
Supreme Court decisions since International Shoe from the stand-
point of the outcomes that an interest analysis approach might
produce. Finally, the Article appraises these varying results and
recommends that the courts employ an approach that more realis-
tically relates to people's everyday activities and more accurately
reflects contemporary goals and policies.
Before examining these issues in more detail, three observa-
tions must be made about the scope of the discussion. First, this
Article presumes that all nonresident defendants will receive no-
tice that is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise" them of the pending action.47 Due process requires ade-
quate notice regardless of the theory that is employed to determine
the scope of a state's authority to exercise judicial jurisdiction. 48
Second, although the discussion in this Article is about the states'
44. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1961); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Lilien-
thal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
45. Professor Sedler lists twenty-nine states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico that have abandoned the vested rights theory in tort cases. Sedler, On Choice of Law
and the Great Quest: A Critique of Special Multistate Solutions to Choice-of-Law
Problems, 7 HOFsTRA L. Rav. 807, 807 n.1 (1979). All these states employ one or more of the
modern choice-of-law theories that take the defendant's interests into account, albeit in
highly variant degrees. See McDougal, supra note 39, at 237-58.
46. Since any rational jurisdictional theory would sustain a state's jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who has engaged in substantial, continuous, and systematic activities
within that state, this element of the International Shoe approach is omitted from further
discussion. The interest analysis theory proposed in this Article would permit a state to
exercise jurisdiction under these circumstances.
47. The Supreme Court formulated this due process standard for giving notice in Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
48. Id. at 312-13.
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authority, it also applies, in most cases, 49 to a federal court's au-
thority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not a resi-
dent of the state in which the federal court sits.50 Last, the discus-
sion focuses on controversies over the states' authority to exercise
judicial jurisdiction in trans-state controversies; it does not include
an analysis of trans-national controversies. Although much of the
discussion applies to both types of disputes, it does not reflect
adjustments that would be necessary because of the overwhelming
importance of power considerations in trans-national contro-
versies.51
II. THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL INADEQUACIES OF THE
MINIMUM CONTACTS STANDARD
A. Undue Reliance on the Territorial Boundaries of States
People in this country, whether acting as individuals or as
members of a group, pay little attention to state boundaries. More-
over, when companies and individuals engage in business activities,
state lines are of almost no moment, since these entities often dis-
tribute their products in many, if not all, states. Those who pro-
vide services typically either furnish them in several states them-
selves or rely on other individuals from these states to sustain their
business, trade, or profession. Because state lines are of such little
importance to the activities of the people in this country, reliance
on the territorial boundaries of states as a basic limit on the states'
authority to exercise judicial jurisdiction is destructive of relevant
interests.
A typical casebook hypothetical 52 vividly demonstrates the ir-
rational nature of a territorial theory of jurisdiction. Assume that a
resident of Texarkana, Arkansas, crosses the state line into Texar-
kana, Texas, and sustains an injury as a result of the unauthorized
conduct of a resident of Texarkana, Texas. Current doctrines pre-
clude Arkansas from exercising jurisdiction over the Texas resident
49. In certain circumstances Congress has expanded federal court jurisdiction. The in-
terpleader statute, for example, authorizes nationwide service of process. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1397,
2361 (1970); see notes 94-99 infra and accompanying text. In addition, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure authorize service on defendants who are brought into the action pursuant to
rules 14 and 19, and who are located "outside the state but within the United States that
are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced." FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(f).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (f).
51. For a discussion of judicial jurisdiction in trans-national controversies, see M. Mc-
DOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 646-56, 706-48 (1963).
52. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 513 (2d ed. 1975).
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because the contacts causing the injury occurred in Texas, not Ar-
kansas. No rational jusitification, however, exists for the proposi-
tion that the Texas resident will be deprived of due process of law
by having to defend an action in a courthouse that is only a five-
minute drive from his residence. Only an artificial view of the limi-
tations that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
imposes on the states can justify such a conclusion.
An incidental result, albeit not an inevitable one, of the terri-
torial nature of the minimum contacts approach has been the Su-
preme Court's focusing-at least since Hanson 53 -solely on the
due process protections of defendants. The Court thus has ignored
the possibility that a plaintiff may also be deprived of due process
of law. A claimant, as a practical matter, arguably suffers a denial
of due process when a potential defendant resides in a distant
state, and the claimant, because of his financial plight, cannot pur-
sue the defendant either to the defendant's home state or to the
state where the contacts engendering the controversy occurred.
A brief hypothetical illustrates such a predicament. Assume
that a resident of New York, who earns slightly more than the
minimum wage, receives a telephone call from a Florida hospital
informing him that his mother has just suffered a heart attack. As-
sume further that the New Yorker uses almost all his available
funds to purchase a round-trip bus ticket to Florida, and that his
mother dies soon after his arrival at the hospital. He decides to
walk to a nearby funeral home to make arrangements for his
mother's funeral, and, while he is crossing the street, a truck
owned by the local gas and electric company runs a red light and
hits him. Although he is not severely injured, the New Yorker in-
curs medical expenses of three thousand dollars and suffers a loss
of wages for six weeks. He returns to New York as soon as possible
to avoid losing his job. The New Yorker's employer allows him to
return to work, but warns him that he will be fired if he misses any
additional work days in the next year. The gas and electric com-
pany's insurance company refuses to pay the New Yorker; it al-
leges that the traffic light was green, and that the New Yorker neg-
ligently walked in front of the truck.
Under these facts, the International Shoe doctrines would
force the New Yorker to sue in Florida because the Florida gas and
electric company has no contacts, ties, or relations with the State
of New York. Litigating this controversy in Florida, however, will
53. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
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impose an undue burden on the claimant, but litigating it in New
York will merely inconvenience the defendant and its insurance
company. The insurance company probably engages in business in
New York, and the gas and electric company undoubtedly sends its
employees to New York on occasion either to examine new prod-
ucts or to learn new operating or management techniques. This hy-
pothetical raises the question whether any rational reason exists
why the claimant, as a practical matter, should be denied his day
in court when a New York forum would not impose an undue bur-
den on the defendant. Due process protections should be equally
applicable to both claimants and defendants. The territorial foun-
dation of the minimum contacts approach, as developed by the Su-
preme Court, not only bears little relation to the activities of peo-
ple in their everyday lives, but also operates as a barrier to an
appropriate consideration of due process protections for all the
parties involved in a controversy.
B. Vagueness of the "Fairness" Criterion
Even if a defendant has had minimum contacts with a state in
which a particular claim arises and has purposefully availed itself
of the benefits and protections of the laws of the state in engaging
in the contact activities, that state still may not be able constitu-
tionally to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant because to do so
would "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.' -54 Commentators commonly refer to this requirement as the
"fairness" or "reasonableness" element of the minimum contacts
approach.5
Predicting the meaning that a court will ascribe to the term
"fairness" will in many controversies be extremely difficult, if not
impossible. Although an articulation of some relevant criteria
could provide considerable guidance in determining the appropri-
ate content of the term in a particular case, the Supreme Court has
failed to promulgate any such standards. Its opinions mention cer-
tain potentially relevant criteria, but deal with them in an incon-
sistent and confusing manner. The criteria that the Court has sug-
54. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
55. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 52, at 526; von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. RE v. 1121, 1166-
67 (1966); Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a




gested include "an estimate of the inconveniences" a defendant
would encounter by defending an action in the forum state 6 and
the parties' locations during the events that precipitated the con-
troversy.57 Commentators also have suggested additional factors
such as "the expectations of the defendant," "the relative aggres-
siveness of the parties," and "consideration of overall trial conve-
nience. 5 s Neither the commentators nor the Court, however, indi-
cates how these various factors should be pieced together to
determine whether a particular exercise of jurisdiction is "fair."
Although the Supreme Court sometimes might be justified in
enunciating and employing highly abstract standards to account
for societal changes, judicial jurisdiction issues do not lend them-
selves to such abstractions. Because judicial jurisdiction questions
usually pose threshold problems that are separate from the merits
of the case, courts should resolve these issues as quickly and inex-
pensively as possible. Vague standards, however, hinder the attain-
ment of these policy goals. Defendants, in good faith, frequently
object to a state's exercise of jurisdiction and thereby delay a reso-
lution of the merits of the case and impose additional costs on the
claimant. Considerable delay can also result when a defendant ex-
ercises his option in some states to seek appellate review of the
jurisdictional issue prior to a decision on the merits.59 In the fed-
eral courts, as well as in those states in which such interlocutory
appeals are prohibited, 0 the defendant can delay a final judg-
ment's enforcement and impose additional costs on claimants by
appealing the jurisdictional issue. If the appellate court determines
that the trial court failed to ascribe the proper meaning to the
term "fair" and thus should not have proceeded to adjudicate the
controversy, then the entire time spent during the trial on the mer-
its will have been wasted-a result that is entirely inconsistent
with current notions of judicial economy.
A rejection of the fairness standard as vague, however, does
not mean that courts must formulate a mechanical solution to judi-
cial jurisdiction controversies. Rather, the failure of the present
56. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
57. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978).
58. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 52, at 554-58. The authors list other
criteria as well: "The identity of the parties" and "the nature of the plaintiff's claim." Id.
Professor Woods lists some of the same factors and adds, among others, "[t]he importance
of the governmental interest" and "choice of law." Woods, supra note 55, at 891-98.




fairness standard suggests that courts should establish jurisdic-
tional policies that are either abstract or sufficiently flexible to ac-
count for all the competing interests at stake in judicial jurisdic-
tion controversies. This proposition leads to the final major
inadequacy of the minimum contacts approach-its failure to
consider sufficiently all the relevant interests at stake in controver-
sies concerning a state's constitutional authority to exercise
jurisdiction.
C. Inadequate Consideration of Interests
In several decisions since International Shoe the Supreme
Court has identified a limited number of interests that are impli-
cated in state jurisdiction controversies. In some cases the outcome
of the Court's decision depended in large part upon the particular
interests that the Court chose to recognize. In McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co.,"1 for example, the Court relied upon
California's "manifest interest in providing effective means of re-
dress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims." 62
In subsequent decisions the Court noted that California's interest
in McGee was an important factor because that state had enacted
special legislation concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over non-
resident insurance companies.6 s
In other cases, however, the Court has given little weight to
relevant interests, primarily because it did not consider them to be
"manifest interests." In Shaffer, for example, counsel argued that
Delaware should be able to exercise jurisdiction over officers and
directors of its corporations because of its strong interest in super-
vising the management of these corporations.6 4 The Court, how-
ever, rejected this argument because Delaware had not enacted a
specific jurisdictional statute to protect such an interest.65 More-
over, in.Kulko v. Superior Court,66 which dealt with an action for
child support that was filed in California, plaintiff argued that Cal-
ifornia had "substantial interests in protecting the welfare of its
minor residents and in promoting to the fullest extent possible a
healthy and supportive family environment in which the children
61. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
62. Id. at 223.
63. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
252 (1958).
64. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
65. Id. at 214.
66. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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of the State are to be raised. ' 67 Although the Court acknowledged
that these interests were "unquestionably important," the Court
held that they were not compelling, since California had not en-
acted a special jurisdictional statute asserting its particularized in-
terests in resolving these issues.6 8 The Court subsequently stated
that the identifiable, substantial interests "simply do not make
California a 'fair forum.' "69
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson"° the Court ini-
tially identified interests other than the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the controversy, but it failed even to mention them
again. Speaking for the majority, Justice White articulated two
specific interests: "[t]he interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies. 7 1 Since the Court failed to expand fur-
ther on these interests, however, their significance for future judi-
cial jurisdiction cases remains unclear.
These opinions evidence the Supreme Court's awareness that
at least some interests are at stake in controversies concerning the
constitutional authority of a state to exercise judicial jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants. These same opinions, however, reveal
that the Court has no definitive perception either of the signifi-
cance of those interests or of the role that they should play in ju-
risdictional decisionmaking. A random and aimless consideration
of the relevant interests in judicial jurisdiction cases only increases
the likelihood that future decisions in this area will continue to be
confused and inconsistent. This trend is in turn likely to result in
decisions that unnecessarily deny the interests at stake in these
controversies. The probability of such outcomes becomes even
more obvious upon a close examination of the role that interests
should play in judicial jurisdiction cases.
III. AN OUTLINE OF A SYSTEMATIC INTEREST ANALYSIS THEORY
WITH EXPLICIT OBJECTIVES
The foundations for a systematic interest analysis theory stem
from the approach Justice Brennan advocates for resolving contro-
versies over the authority of a state to exercise judicial jurisdiction.
67. Id. at 98.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 100.
70. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
71. Id. at 292.
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The Justice summarized this approach in his joint dissenting opin-
ion in World-Wide Volkswagen and Rush: "If a plaintiff can show
that his chosen forum State has a sufficient interest in the litiga-
tion (or sufficient contacts with the defendant), then the defendant
who cannot show some real injury to a constitutionally protected
interest. . . should have no constitutional excuse not to appear. '7 2
With some modest reformulation and expansion, Justice Brennan's
statement can be transformed into a systematic interest analysis
approach to jurisdictional issues.
One necessary modification of the Justice's basic proposition is
the expansion of the parenthetical reference to contacts. As previ-
ously noted," contacts have no significance apart from the inter-
ests that they indicate. Contacts, as the Supreme Court has de-
fined the term, comprise only a limited portion of the overall
factual context of a particular controversy. The identification of all
relevant interests in any controversy requires that each feature of
the factual context-not simply the "contacts"-be examined. The
parenthetical statement, therefore, should read as follows: "as de-
termined by an examination of all the facts and circumstances in a
particular controversy." This broader examination also removes
any unnecessarily restrictive territorial perspective from the pro-
posed form of interest analysis.
Another required modification of Justice Brennan's statement
concerns the use of the adjective "sufficient," which the Justice
employs to modify "interests." Rather than merely ascertaining
whether the interest is "sufficient," courts should evaluate the
strength of the forum state's interest in resolving the controversy.
In several types of controversies the forum state's interest in exer-
cising jurisdiction may be substantial. 4 Common examples might
include child support actions for children residing in the forum
state and suits against insurance companies that have issued poli-
cies to state residents. Although the existence of a specific jurisdic-
tional statute frequently will indicate the existence of a substantial
state interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction, the absence of such
a statute does not automatically negate the presence of these inter-
72. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 299, 312 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (dissent also applies to Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)).
73. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 119 infra and accompanying text. Such substantial interests were present
in two cases since International Shoe: McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., see notes




ests." The substantiality of a state interest in exercising jurisdic-
tion turns on the potential impact that a failure to exercise juris-
diction may have on the state's internal value processes. In child
support cases, for example, the inability of their state of residence
to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may cause the
affected children to suffer deprivations, and the state thus will be
forced to provide support so that the children can live at a mini-
mum subsistence level. A court should consider the strength of the
forum state's need to exercise judicial jurisdiction in its final ac-
commodation of interests in a controversy over the state's constitu-
tional authority to have the matter litigated in its courts.
Justice Brennan's summary deals strictly with the interests of
the forum state; it fails to consider the interests of other states and
of the collective community of states that are at stake in these con-
troversies. As will be seen, these interests warrant consideration
because they are of prime importance in certain cases that deal
with the states' authority to adjudicate controversies.7 6 Thus, a
court should identify and consider the common interests of all af-
fected states and the collective community of states in its resolu-
tion of jurisdictional issues.
These preliminary observations permit a more detailed outline
of a systematic interest analysis approach to the question whether
a state has the constitutional authority to exercise.jurisdiction in a
particular case. At the outset, a systematic interest analysis re-
quires the identification of all relevant interests that potentially
are at stake in a controversy. For convenience, the interests of par-
ticular states will be referred to as exclusive interests, and the in-
terests of the collective community of states will be referred to as
inclusive interests. An interest consists of demands for values in
addition to expectations about the conditions under which the de-
mands can be secured.
7
7
75. For criticism of the Supreme Court's position that these statutes are necessary, see
notes 172-75 infra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 79-105 infra and accompanying text.
77. For a more detailed discussion of what constitutes an interest, see McDougal,
supra note 39, at 212. The author expands on this definition as follows:
This definition underlines the point that a mere hope is not an interest, and also sug-
gests that extreme caution must be exercised to prevent a simple concern from being
identified as an interest. Although some concerns may ripen into the stronger senti-
ment of a demand, others may not. Both hopes and simple concerns are excluded from
the definition because they are not sufficiently intense sentiments to justify considera-
tion by authoritative decisionmakers. The conditions under which demands are sought




Because the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
is designed to protect individuals and private associations from op-
pressive state action, private or individual interests arguably
should also be considered in determining whether an exercise of
jurisdiction is constitutional. The present inquiry, however, omits
this separate category of private interests for two reasons. First, in
most controversies the relevant exclusive and inclusive interests at
stake reflect interests that are identical to those of the individual
parties. In these cases, therefore, a separate identification of pri-
vate interests would serve no useful purpose. Second, in those
cases in which a party alleges that the exclusive and inclusive in-
terests at stake are incompatible with his interest, or that he has
additional interests that are not reflected in the relevant exclusive
and inclusive interests, the interests thus asserted will be eccentric
interests-interests that are inconsistent with normal demands
and expectations. For example, the defendant may assert an inter-
est in not having to defend the action in a distant state because he
has a fear of flying and would need more time than most people to
travel to and from the distant forum. Such idiosyncratic interests
should not fall within the scope of due process protections. More-
over, the recognition of private interests would encourage ingenu-
ity in conjuring interests for the sole purpose of arguing against an
exercise of jurisdiction. These conjured interests would unduly
complicate jurisdictional decisions and would serve- no rational
purpose. Thus, courts should view relevant exclusive and inclusive
interests as adequately protecting the interests of private associa-
tions and individuals in disputes over a state's authority to exer-
cise jurisdiction. 5
For additional discussion of the definition of an interest employed in this article, see H.
LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SociRtY §§ 2.1-.3 (1950); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL &
I. VLASIC, supra note 51, at 145-50 (1963).
78. Although courts traditionally have viewed due process protections in the jurisdic-
tional context to be relevant only in trans-state controversies, the removal of existing terri-
torial perspectives of jurisdiction suggests the potential for their application in intrastate
controversies. Assume, for example, that ah extremely wealthy resident of Dallas, Texas,
sues a relatively poor resident of El Paso, Texas. Assume further that the state venue stat-
ute permits suit to be filed in the plaintiff's county of residence. The defendant's burden of
having to defend the action in Dallas may be severe, and, therefore, due process violations
may exist. In these intrastate cases, a category of private interests may be useful. Courts,
however, should evaluate these interests from a third person's view of the facts rather than
from the viewpoint of the parties themselves.
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A. Identification of All Relevant Interests
1. Exclusive Interests
Because the various state legislatures enacted existing jurisdic-
tional statutes in reliance upon the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tions of due process limitations on judicial jurisdiction, these stat-
utes reflect little more than the interest of the various states'
legislators in expanding the competence of their courts to exercise
jurisdiction to the maximum extent permissible under the Su-
preme Court's interpretations."9 Existing statutes thus provide lit-
tle help in ascertaining the scope and content of the various states'
exclusive interests in the jurisdictional competence of their tribu-
nals. This inquiry, therefore, must focus on whatever supplemental
interests are reflected in postulated policies on jurisdictional is-
sues.80 Only in this manner can one identify the relevant exclusive
interests that reflect the probable demands and expectations which
authoritative decisionmakers of the various states would assert if
the territorial constraints of existing Supreme Court jurisdictional
doctrines were removed.
Before identifying these supplemental exclusive interests, one
must first determine when a state has an interest at stake in a ju-
risdictional controversy. For the purposes of this Article, a state
interest may be said to exist whenever either the events precipitat-
ing the controversy or the ultimate decision significantly affects
the state's people, resources, or institutions. These interests may
be implicated regardless of whether the controversy is being liti-
79. The statutes commonly referred to as "long-arm statutes" exemplify the type of
statutes that state legislatures have enacted for such purposes. These statutes typically con-
fer jurisdiction on the courts of a state when a cause of action arises out of the following
occurrences, among others: business transacted within the state; the commission of a tort
within the state; the ownership, use, or possession of real property in the state; or a marital
relationship domiciled in the state. See, e.g., Civil Practice Act § 17, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 (West 1968 & Supp.
1981); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW § 302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). State legislatures en-
acted these statutes and amended them to take advantage of the expanded scope of state
court jurisdiction permissible under the minimum contacts approach enunciated in Interna-
tional Shoe. Certain states enacted even broader statutes, which permit their courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction to the maximum extent that is constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., CAL.
CiV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering Supp. 1981). This approach is preferable because it per-
mits state courts to exercise jurisdiction without additional legislative action when and if
the Supreme Court further expands the scope of the states' authority to exercise jurisdic-
tion. These statutes also avoid any expressed reliance on the minimum contacts, neo-territo-
rial approach of International Shoe.
80. These supplemental interests are defined from the standpoint of an observer iden-
tifying with all states.
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gated in the state's own courts or the courts of a sister state.
Any judicial decision potentially causes impacts that are both
direct and indirect. The phrase "direct impacts" refers to the value
indulgences or deprivations that a decision imposes upon the par-
ties to the litigation. The phrase "indirect impacts" refers to the
value indulgences or deprivations that the ultimate decision may
impose upon nonparties who have some relationship either to the
litigants themselves or to other state residents. Indirect impacts
commonly affect the members of a party's family, a parent corpo-
ration of a corporate party, the stockholders of a corporate defen-
dant, a defendant's insurance company, or members of an associa-
tion that is a party to the litigation. The phrase "ultimate
decision" indicates that the inquiry should focus not only on the
impacts that the jurisdictional decision may have on the parties
and nonparties, but also on the impacts that may result from a
decision on the merits of the case. Because the forum in which the
controversy is litigated may significantly affect both a party's abil-
ity to participate in the litigation and the ultimate resolution of
the controversy, this dual focus is necessary. A party who is forced
to litigate in a distant state, for example, may effectively be pre-
cluded from prosecuting or defending the action; the controversy,
therefore, may be resolved against him either because he is unable
to present his case to authoritative decisionmakers or because his
absence necessitates the entering of a default judgment.
States with potential interests at stake in a judicial jurisdic-
tion controversy thus include the following: (1) the state of resi-
dence of each claimant; (2) the state of residence of each defen-
dant; (3) a state in which any of the resources that are the subject
of the controversy are located; (4) states in which all or part of the
events engendering the controversy occurred; (5) states in which
nonparties whom the ultimate decision may significantly affect re-
side; and (6) the forum state. The exclusive interests of each of
these potentially interested states are examined next.
(a) A Claimant's State of Residence
States originally established and continue to maintain judicial
systems primarily to provide a forum for the resolution of contro-
versies in which their residents'81 value positions may be affected.
81. Individuals or private associations reside in a state whenever their factual relation-
ship with the state reasonably entitles them to the state's enhancement or protective poli-
cies. Factors that should be considered in determining whether such a factual relationship
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Thus, whenever a state resident becomes involved in a controversy,
and the resident decides to have the controversy resolved through
the application of the prevailing community policies, the claim-
ant's state of residence has an interest in providing a forum for the
resolution of that controversy. This exclusive interest exists even
though the events engendering the controversy occurred in whole
or in part beyond the territorial bounds of the state. Moreover,
because a resident effectively may be deprived of a day in court if
he is forced to seek judicial redress in some distant state, a claim-
ant's state of residence has an interest in ensuring that its re-
sidents are not subjected to an undue burden in the prosecution of
their claims by having to pursue their action in a distant forum.
(b) A Defendant's State of Residence
Not surprisingly, the exclusive interests of a defendant's state
of residence mirror those of the state in which a claimant resides.
A defendant's state of residence has an interest in providing a fo-
rum for the resolution of controversies in which its residents have
become involved. It also has an interest in ensuring that its re-
sidents are not subjected to an undue burden by being forced to
defend litigation in a distant forum and thereby being deprived of
the opportunity to present defenses that they might want to assert.
(c) A State in Which Resources That Are the Subject of the
Controversy Are Located
When countervailing claims exist for the entitlement to the
use or ownership of any resource8 2 located within a state, the state
has an interest in providing a forum to resolve these claims. This
interest is reflected in a variety of state resources policies, includ-
ing a desire to ensure that resources are freely alienable and availa-
ble for productive use by designating clearly the people who are
entitled to use these resources. In some instances the state may
also have an interest in identifying those persons who are responsi-
ble for paying state and local taxes on the resources.
exists include both the length of time that the individual or private association has been
acting within the state and the extent and nature of those activities.
82. The term "resource" is used in a broad sense to include not only land and its
various valuable components, but also personal property in all its protean forms-including
items such as stocks and bonds.
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(d) A State in Which the Events Engendering a Controversy
Occurred
Just because an event engendering a controversy between non-
residents occurred within the territorial bounds of a state does not
automatically mean that the state in which the events occurred has
an interest in providing a forum for the resolution of the contro-
versy. Such a state acquires an interest in providing a forum only
when the events engendering the controversy have significantly af-
fected-or the ultimate decision in the controversy may signifi-
cantly affect-the people, resources, or institutions of that state.
This situation necessitates an examination of the facts of each case
to determine whether the events engendering the controversy or
the ultimate decision either has produced or may produce the req-
uisite effect.
A hypothetical can best illustrate this proposition. If some
nonresidents, while present in one state, execute an agreement that
is to be performed in some other state, the mere execution of the
agreement in the former state does not give that state an interest
in providing a forum for the resolution of a controversy over the
agreement. If, however, the agreement was to be performed in the
state of contract, and either the parties' nonperformance or the
manner in which the agreement was performed adversely affected
the residents of the state, then this state would have an interest in
providing a forum for the resolution of the controversy. This inter-
est exists because resolution of the controversy might be advan-
tageous to the state's residents. For example, damages paid for a
breach of the agreement ultimately would result in the state's re-
sidents being paid for services or products that they provided to
the party seeking enforcement of the agreement. The decision in a
tort action likewise could significantly affect an injured state resi-
dent regardless of whether he is a party to the particular contro-
versy. A reduction or elimination of the available insurance funds
poses a significant threat to the resident nonparty. Furthermore, a
number of state residents such as doctors and hospitals also may
want the controversy resolved so they can receive compensation for
the services that they rendered to the injured party.8
83. The existence of these creditors ordinarily does not indicate that the state in
which the injury occurred possesses an interest in applying its substantive tort law to re-
solve the controversy, since tort doctrines are not formulated for these purposes. See Mc-
Dougal, The New Frontier in Choice of Law-Trans-State Laws: The Need Demonstrated
in Theory and in the Context of Motor Vehicle Guest-Host Controversies, 53 TUL. L. REv.
731, 744-45 (1979). Nevertheless, the reasons why states choose to maintain their judicial
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(e) A State in Which Significantly Affected Nonparties Reside
Because the ultimate decision significantly affects these non-
parties, either favorably or adversely, the state in which they re-
side has an interest in providing a forum for the resolution of the
controversy. This interest exists even though none of the parties
resides in the state and the precipitating events occurred in an-
other state.
(f) The Forum State
Just because a claimant elects to file suit in a particular state
does not mean that the state has an interest in providing a forum
for the resolution of the controversy. This proposition remains true
even though the claimant may have served process on the defen-
dant while the latter was temporarily present in the state. If, for
example, none of the parties resides in a particular state, the con-
troversy does not concern any of the state's resources, the ultimate
decision will not significantly affect any nonparty residents, and
none of the events engendering the controversy occurred in the
state, then this state has no interest in providing the litigants with
a forum because nothing has occurred that would affect its people,
resources, or institutions. In this situation only a presumed inter-
est-an interest based on unrealistic appraisals of the conditions
under which the other states, both individually and collectively,
would permit the state in question to provide a forum-could ex-
ist.s4 On the other hand, because of other exclusive and inclusive
interests, a disinterested forum might provide an appropriate tri-
bunal for resolving certain trans-state controversies. 5
2. Inclusive Interests
The doctrines that relate to adjudicative jurisdiction allocate
the business of judicial decisionmaking among the states and pro-
vide litigants from different states with fundamental protections.
The collective community of states, therefore, possesses certain in-
terests in jurisdictional controversies. The Supreme Court's early
determination that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment imposes limitations on the states' authority to exercise
systems are broad enough to include the provision of a forum for the resolution of contro-
versies that may benefit these creditors.
84. For an additional discussion of presumed interests, see H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN,
supra note 77, §§ 2.3-.4.
85. For a discussion of these situations, see notes 139-46 infra and accompanying text.
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judicial jurisdiction is indicative of the significance of these inclu-
sive interests.
As a basic policy, a free democratic society should seek to pro-
vide a claimant with at least one forum in which he may timely
87
present his claim against all those who allegedly have caused, are
causing, or may cause the claimant to suffer value deprivations. A
failure to provide such a forum may subject the .claimant to con-
flicting decisions that completely or substantially deny him any re-
dress, even though at least one of a number of defendants clearly
should bear responsibility for the claimant's plight. In Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,88 for example, the claimant was in-
jured in California when a pressure tank, which Buckeye Boiler
had manufactured in Ohio, exploded. A California doctor's negli-
gent treatment in a California hospital aggravated his injuries. Pre-
trial efforts yielded no conclusion about whether the explosion or
the subsequent negligent treatment caused the claimant's incapaci-
tating hemiplegic condition. If the court had forced the claimant to
bring an action in Ohio against Buckeye and a separate action
against the doctor and hospital in California, it conceivably could
have denied him any relief; the Ohio court might have determined
that the California doctor and hospital were responsible for the
claimant's condition, and the California court might have found
that the Ohio company was the culpable party. Thus, the claimant
would have been denied recovery for his hemiplegic condition even
though one of the defendants clearly was responsible for the in-
jury. 9 The collective community of states possesses an interest in
preventing such a result, and the due process clause cannot ration-
86. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
87. The exclusive interests reflected in the various states' statutes of limitations limit
the duration of this policy to reasonable periods of time. A claimant, therefore, must present
his claim to authoritative decisionmakers in a timely manner. For further discussion of the
interrelationship between the doctrines that are relevant to judicial jurisdiction and statutes
of limitations, see note 146 infra and accompanying text.
88. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
89. In the Buckeye opinion Justice Peters relied in part on this potentiality for incon-
sistent results to sustain California's exercise of judicial jurisdiction. Id. at 906, 458 P.2d at
67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123. He also relied in part on California's interest and the undue burden
that would be imposed on plaintiff if he were forced to proceed against Buckeye in Ohio.
The justice stated that
[t]he state has a substantial interest in affording the plaintiff, a California resident, a
forum in which he may seek whatever redress is warranted, especially where, as here, it
is quite likely that the plaintiff cannot, for financial as well as possible physical rea-
sons, pursue his claim in the distant state where the defendant has its principal place
of business.
Id. at 906, 458 P.2d at 66-67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
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ally be viewed as compelling it.
An inclusive interest also exists in protecting defendants from
exposure to multiple liability for the same conduct. New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Dunlevye0 demonstrated that such exposure was
possible under traditional jurisdictional doctrines. The case cen-:
tered on whether Gould had made a valid assignment to his daugh-
ter, Mrs. Dunlevy, of the cash surrender value of a life insurance
policy that New York Life had issued to Gould. A Pennsylvania
jury determined in an interpleader action that no valid assignment
had occurred, and the cash surrender value was paid to Gould. 1 In
a subsequent action a federal district court in California held that
the assignment of the cash surrender value was valid and entered a
judgment against the insurance company in favor of Mrs. Dun-
levy.92 The Supreme Court upheld this latter judgment on the
ground that the Pennsylvania court lacked jurisdiction over Mrs.
Dunlevy because she had not appeared in the action, she was not a
citizen of Pennsylvania, and she had not been served with process
in the state. According to the Court, therefore, the Pennsylvania
court could not affect "her personal rights."93
Congress acted quickly to prevent such absurd results in a
large number of cases by enacting an interpleader statute.9 This
statute provides that when two or more claimants of diverse citi-
zenship are-or claim that they are-entitled to a fund or debt of
five hundred dollars or more, the party who either has the fund or
is responsible for the debt can force a resolution of all the conflict-
ing claims in a single action.9 5 Of particular significance to the pre-
sent discussion is Congress' authorization of nationwide service of
process under these circumstances.96 This statute reflects the inclu-
sive interest of the collective community of states in protecting a
potential defendant from exposure to multiple liability.
The statute also indicates that the Supreme Court's territorial
conception of due process limitations may not be absolute.' 7 Al-
90. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
91. Id. at 520.
92. Id. at 519.
93. Id. at 521.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 2361.
97. The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue whether the minimum
contacts approach applies to an interpleader action. In a case decided after International
Shoe but before Shaffer, the Supreme Court stressed the utility of the interpleader statute
for the resolution of multiple claims to a fund. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire,
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though prior to Shaffer an argument could be made that the in
personam classification of an interpleader action in Dunlevy was
erroneous, and that the proper classification was in rem,9 8 the
Shaffer decision effectively precluded any further characterization
attempts of this kind. Thus, minimum contacts are required re-
gardless of how the action traditionally might have been character-
ized.9 Nevertheless, modifying the facts in Dunlevy demonstrates
how the interpleader statute permits a state to obtain jurisdiction
over a defendant who has not had the requisite minimum contacts.
In Dunlevy the questionable assignment occurred when both
Gould and his daughter, Mrs. Dunlevy, were residents of Penn-
sylvania. Mrs. Dunlevy, however, moved to California before the
interpleader action was filed in Pennsylvania. Had she filed an ac-
tion against the ingurance company in California prior to the ac-
tion being filed in Pennsylvania, the insurance company could have
employed the interpleader statute to force Gould to defend the ac-
tion in California-even though he had no contacts with that state.
Thus, even in the absence of a defendant's consent to jurisdiction,
minimum contacts need not exist under prevailing jurisdictional
doctrines when important inclusive interests are at stake in the
controversy.
The collective community of states also possesses an interest
in providing the greatest possible economy in resolving trans-state
controversies. Only in rare circumstances should due process re-
quire multiple litigation over identical, closely related, or overlap-
ping factual issues. Such repetitive litigation in two or more states
sacrifices judicial efficiency and imposes an obvious burden on in-
dividual claimants. The collective community of states, therefore,
has an interest in precluding, to the maximum extent feasible, the
unnecessary waste of individual and state resources on repetitive
litigation.
The various statutes and court rules permitting class actions
clearly reflect this particular inclusive interest. 100 Class actions pro-
386 U.S. 523 (1967). Because the resolution of all these claims in a single controversy is such
an important goal, the Supreme Court is unlikely to undermine severely the utility of the
interpleader statute by requiring all the defendants in the interpleader action to have mini-
mum contacts with the forum state.
98. See, e.g., 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1711
(1972).
99. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For a listing and brief outline of the various state
statutes and court rules that permit class actions, see 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS §§ 1220-1220b (1977).
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mote judicial and party economy; they also vividly demonstrate
the difficulties inherent in a territorial conception of judicial juris-
diction, since the plaintiffs and the members of the defendant class
frequently reside in several states. The Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the issue whether minimum contacts are required in class
actions, but several commentators have argued that such contacts
should not be a prerequisite to jurisdiction in these cases. 101 A re-
quirement that all defendants in a class action have contacts with
the forum state would severely undermine the utility of the class
action. Moreover, this requirement would frustrate the interests
reflected in the statutes and court rules that authorize class ac-
tions. In United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc.,10 for exam-
ple, black- and Spanish-surnamed employees filed suit alleging
that a nationwide class of trucking employers had violated Title
VIII03 by engaging in discriminatory practices and policies. To
deny a class action in this case because the plaintiff class failed to
demonstrate that all the trucking employers had minimum con-
tacts with the forum state would contravene the inclusive interest
in resolving these controversies in a single action. This potential
scenario supports the proposition that important inclusive inter-
ests should outweigh minimum contact protections.104 This inclu-
sive interest should not simply permit consolidation of claims
against residents of several states when the facts are identical,
closely related, or overlapping; it should require such consolidation
unless other relevant exclusive and inclusive interests compel sepa-
rate actions. Only in this manner can individuals and states enjoy
a high degree of judicial efficiency and economy in litigation costs.
Just as each state possesses an exclusive interest in ensuring
101. See, e.g., Note, Consumer Class Actions with a Multistate Class: A Problem of
Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411 (1974); Note, Personal Jurisdiction and Rule 23 Defen-
dant Class Actions, 53 IND. L.J. 841 (1978); Note, Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State
Court Jurisdiction over Class Actions, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
102. 72 F.R.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
104. The court summarily rejected the claims against some trucking companies who
had not been served with process on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction. The court stated,
It has long been the law in the courts of the United States that in an otherwise
proper class action suit, non-party members of the class need not be brought personally
before the Court, as long as the requirements of due process-in this context, primarily
notice and representativeness of named class members-are afforded them. . . . The
class action thus stands as the outstanding exception to the general rule that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in litigation to which he/she has not been made a
party by service of process.
United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 99-100 (D.D.C. 1976).
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that its residents are not subjected to an undue burden in having
to litigate a controversy in a distant forum, the collective commu-
nity of states has an inclusive interest in avoiding precisely the
same situation. Except in relatively rare instances, 105 traditional
and existing jurisdictional doctrines reflect this interest. In addi-
tion, the collective community of states possesses an interest in en-
.suring that plaintiffs have open access to forums in which they can
effectively present their grievances. Even a superficial examination
of the exclusive and inclusive interests identified above reveals
that, in the context of particular controversies, conflicting and
competing interests may exist. In these cases courts must accom-
modate the various inclusive and exclusive interests.
B. The Accommodation of Relevant Interests
The objective of decisionmakers who are confronted with a
controversy concerning a state's constitutional authority to exer-
cise jurisdiction naturally will vary according to whether the state
is an interested or disinterested forum. A state with a valid inter-
est in providing a forum for the resolution of the ultimate contro-
versy should have the constitutional authority to exercise judicial
jurisdiction unless to do so would unnecessarily deny either the ex-
clusive interests of other states or the inclusive interests of the col-
lective community of states. A state without a valid interest in
providing a forum should also have the constitutional authority to
exercise jurisdiction when that exercise will most appropriately ac-
commodate the exclusive and inclusive interests at stake in the
controversy. A systematic interest analysis can be employed to at-
tain these objectives. Its employment in a number of situations will
now be examined.
1. An Interested Forum When Only a Single Defendant and a
Single Claimant Are Involved in the Controversy
(a) When the Defendant Will Not Be Subjected to an Undue
Burden in the Forum State
If an initial inquiry reveals that the state in which the plaintiff
filed suit has an interest in providing a forum for the resolution of
the controversy, the next question is whether the selected forum
will impose an undue burden on the defendant. One might argue
that if the forum state is an interested state, it should have the
105. See, e.g., notes 4-6 & 53 supra and accompanying text.
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authority to resolve the controversy without further inquiry.10 6
This approach fails to consider the total impact that the exercise
of jurisdiction may have on the other exclusive and inclusive inter-
ests at stake in the case and, therefore, may produce decisions that
unnecessarily frustrate those interests. The exercise of jurisdiction
by one interested state obviously contravenes the exclusive inter-
ests of other states that have an interest in providing a forum. This
deprivation alone, however, should not preclude a state from exer-
cising jurisdiction, since all states are on an equal footing in terms
of judicial authority. A state should be permitted to exercise juris-
diction if to do so would not deny any interests other than the
exclusive interests of other states in providing a forum. An oppo-
site conclusion would result in a completely untenable situation: no
forum would exist when more than one state has an interest in
providing a forum, since exercise by one would defeat the interest
of the other.107 Only a determination of whether an exercise of ju-
risdiction will impose an undue burden on the defendant will en-
sure that a court will adequately consider both the exclusive inter-
est of the defendant's state of residence and the comparable
inclusive interest of the collective community of states.
Before one can examine the factors that courts should con-
sider in determining whether an undue burden will be imposed on
a defendant, a preliminary point warrants emphasis-state lines
are of no moment in the determination. A resident of Connecticut,
for example, cannot contend seriously that defending an action in
New York City will impose an undue burden on him. A valid claim
of a potential undue burden exists only when the distance between
the defendant's residence and the state in which the plaintiff filed
suit becomes so great that the time and expense required to defend
the action in the forum state would impose a severe burden on the
defendant.
When the forum state is sufficiently distant from the defen-
dant's residence to create the possibility of an undue burden, the
106. This argument parallels the assertions of Professor Brainerd Currie that the fo-
rum in choice-of-law cases should apply its law to resolve the controversy because courts
should not weigh competing interests. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Con-
flict of Laws, 1959 DuKE L.J. 171, 176-77, reprinted in B. CURRm, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAws 177, 182 (1963). For a criticism of this argument in choice-of-law cases,
see McDougal, Comprehensive Interest Analysis Versus Reformulated Governmental In-
terest Analysis: An Appraisal in the Context of Choice-of-Law Problems Concerning Con-
tributory and Comparative Negligence, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 439, 451-52 (1979).
107. This potential situation demonstrates that in many cases a resolution of the con-
troversy will be impossible without denying some interests.
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defendant's past activities should be an initial, relevant factor in
the decision concerning jurisdiction. If the defendant is a private
association 1 8 that engages in a variety of activities in a large num-
ber of states, the argument that defending an action in any of
these states-or even in neighboring states-will be unduly bur-
densome is unpersuasive. This proposition remains true even if the
events engendering the controversy did not occur in the forum
state. As the activities of a private association become more local-
ized, the potential that litigating in a distant state will impose an
undue burden on the defendant increases. A hypothetical that
Judge Sobeloff posed in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Inc.109 demonstrates this notion. Assume that a California private
association sells automobile tires primarily to California residents,
but that it occasionally sells to nonresidents who are traveling in
California. If the association sells a tire to a vacationing Penn-
sylvania resident, and the tire subsequently proves to be defective
and causes an injury to the purchaser after his return to Penn-
sylvania, then a defense of the action in Pennsylvania-assuming
that the private association is strictly a California enterprise with
limited financial resources-will impose an undue burden on the
California association. On the other hand, if the purchaser were a
resident of Arizona, Oregon, or Nevada, and the plaintiff filed suit
in one of these states, defense of the action probably would impose
only a minimal burden on the private association. Of course, if the
tire manufacturer distributes its tires in Pennsylvania or nearby
states, it should not be able to claim successfully that defending a
lawsuit in Pennsylvania would be overly burdensome.
The above discussion also applies to individual defendants. In
many instances an individual's work frequently takes him to a
number of states. Therefore, litigation in one of those states-even
over controversies that did not arise out of his activities in those
states-would not impose an undue burden on the defendant. The
California case of Cornelison v. Chaney110 provides an example of
such a fact situation. In Cornelison a California resident's hus-
band, who was also a resident of California, died when defendant's
truck collided with the husband's automobile in Nevada. Defen-
dant, a resident of Nebraska, drove a truck for a living and hauled
goods between several states. He had driven to California approxi-
108. Private associations include the whole range of nongovernmental groups such as
corporations, unincorporated associations, and partnerships.
109. 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956).
110. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
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mately twenty times in. each of the previous seven years, and he
was licensed by the California Public Utilities Commission to haul
freight. On each trip he made a delivery to California and picked
up a load to be delivered elsewhere. When an individual engages in
such systematic activities within a forum state, one cannot ration-
ally conclude that defense of an action in that state-even though
the controversy arose elsewhere-will impose an undue burden on
the defendant. Even when an individual's activities prove to be less
than systematic in the forum state, his recent presence
there-whether for business or pleasure-nevertheless may indi-
cate that defending an action within the state will not impose an
undue burden on the defendant. Service of process on a defendant
within a particular state, however, has no significance apart from
demonstrating the defendant's recent presence within that
state-a presence that may be an isolated and insignificant fac-
tor."' If the defendant has not been in the forum state in the re-
cent past, and he resides in a state that is a considerable distance
from the forum state, then an increased possibility exists that a
defense in the forum state will impose an undue burden on the
defendant.
The defendant's wealth also warrants consideration when
measuring the ultimate burden that litigating in a foreign forum
will impose. Although many instances arise in which the wealth of
individuals and private associations is irrelevant to a determina-
tion of the scope of protection that society will afford them, a real-
istic evaluation of the burden imposed by a defense in a distant
forum must include a consideration of the litigants' financial re-
sources. Even though courts that apply the fairness standard of
International Shoe rarely explicitly identify wealth as a crite-
rion,112 the defendant's resources must influence their decisions.
111. This explicitly rejects the so-called "transient jurisdiction" rule with which a
state obtains jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by service of process on the defen-
dant while he is temporarily in the state. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 25, § 27. The Shaffer
decision, by extending the fairness standard of International Shoe to almost all state court
exercises of jurisdiction, casts a substantial doubt over the constitutionality of the transient
jurisdiction rule. State courts since Shaffer, however, have upheld the constitutionality of
transient jurisdiction by relying on the "if he be not present within the forum" language the
Supreme Court employed in International Shoe just before it set forth the minimum con-
tacts test. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733, 273 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1980). A
defendant's temporary presence within a state, however, should only be considered in deter-
mining whether defense of the action in that state would impose an undue burden on the
defendant.
112. But see Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732
(1966). The court set forth several factors that a court should consider in determining
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The consideration proves valuable in giving content to the notions
of both fairness and undue burden. For example, if the forum state
is California and the defendant is a New York multimillionaire
who owns a private jet, reason dictates that defense of a contro-
versy in California would not impose an undue burden on the
defendant. If, however, the New York defendant earns only a mod-
erate income and can barely sustain a minimal lifestyle, a determi-
nation that defense of an action in California would impose an un-
due burden on him would be a truism. The same differences in the
burdens imposed exist between a multimillion dollar private asso-
ciation and a small private association that is struggling for
financial survival. For individual defendants, additional factors
such as the individual's health or age may also prove relevant to
the determination whether a defense of a particular action would
subject that individual to an undue burden.
As the above discussion suggests, drawing the line between a
reasonable burden and an undue burden will often prove difficult.
In borderline cases courts should presume the existence of an un-
due burden. Although this presumption may not ensure that de-
fendants will alwa:is avoid defending an action in a distant fo-
rum,113 it will give maximum deference to both the exclusive
interest of the defendant's state and the inclusive interest of the
collective community of states in protecting defendants from un-
due burdens.
If an examination of the relevant factors outlined above indi-
cates that the defendant will not be subjected to an undue burden
in the interested forum which the plaintiff has selected, the forum
state should possess the authority to apply its policy and resolve
the controversy. In this situation a state's exercise of jurisdiction
will not deny any exclusive or inclusive interest at stake in the con-
troversy other than, perhaps, the exclusive interest of some other
whether an exercise of jurisdiction is "fair," including the following:
First, the court should consider the nature and size of the manufacturer's business. As
the probability of the product entering interstate commerce and the size or volume of
the business increase, the fairness of making the manufacturer defend in the plaintiff's
forum increases. Second, the court should consider the economic independence of the
plaintiff. A poor man is likely to become a public ward if his injuries are uncompen-
sated. Moreover, he may not be able to afford a trip to another jurisdiction to institute
suit. In addition, he may feel unable to cope with the prospect of traveling to a strange
state. The immobility of our lower economic class is well known.
Id. at 260, 413 P.2d at 738. See also Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
906, 458 P.2d 57, 66-67, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 122-23 (1969).
113. See notes 115-20 infra and accompanying text.
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state in providing a forum. As previously noted,11 4 this isolated de-
nial is not a sufficient reason for depriving a state of the authority
to exercise jurisdiction.
(b) When the Defendant Will Be Subjected to an Undue
Burden in the Forum State
A conclusion that the defendant will be subjected to an undue
burden by litigating in a distant forum necessitates a further anal-
ysis of other potentially relevant interests. In this situation the in-
quiry should shift to a determination whether another forum, such
as the defendant's state of residence, exists in which the contro-
versy can be adjudicated without imposing a burden on either the
plaintiff or the defendant. An examination of the plaintiff's charac-
teristics-including his activities, wealth, and other relevant fac-
tors-may reveal that the controversy can be resolved either in the
defendant's home state or in some other state without imposing an
undue burden on either party. This type of situation would exist,
for example, when the plaintiff is a large, nationwide private asso-
ciation that engages in activities in the defendant's state of resi-
dence or another nearby state. If such a forum exists, it should be
given jurisdictional precedence over the forum that was chosen ini-
tially. An opposite result would deny both the exclusive interest of
the defendant's state of residence and the inclusive interest of the
collective community of states in protecting defendants from un-
due burdens, and it would further only the initially chosen forum's
interest in providing a tribunal for the resolution of the
controversy.
Of course, in some instances every available forum may sub-
ject at least one party to an undue burden. In this situation either
the plaintiff must file in a distant forum or the defendant must
defend in a distant forum. A slight modification of the facts in
Kulko v. Superior Court 5 demonstrates this potential scenario.
Assume that a husband and wife, who are domiciled in New York,
decide to separate and execute a separation agreement. The wife
agrees to permit the couple's two children to remain with their fa-
ther in New York so the children can graduate from the high
school in which they presently are enrolled. She also agrees not to
request any child support payments from her husband. The
114. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
115. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). For a brief outline of the actual facts of this case, see notes
176-78 infra and accompanying text.
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mother then moves to California, where both children later decide
to join her. Assume further that the mother earns only the mini-
mum wage, and the father earns less than twice the minimum
wage. The wife, therefore, finally decides that she must seek child
support payments. If the wife has to sue in New York, she will
suffer an undue burden; if she sues in California, the undue burden
shifts to her husband. In addition, trying the case in either forum
necessarily will frustrate the exclusive interest of the state that is
not chosen as the forum state. Thus, an exclusive interest analysis
results in a stalemate, and the inclusive interest in protecting liti-
gants from being subjected to an undue burden will be partially
promoted and partially frustrated in whichever state the contro-
versy is litigated.
Existing jurisdictional doctrines would require the plaintiff in
the above hypothetical to litigate the controversy in the defen-
dant's state of residence because the defendant does not have suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the plaintiff's state of residence. 116
Thus, these doctrines would afford the defendant maximum pro-
tection from an undue burden, but they would ignore the undue
burden that would be imposed on the plaintiff.117 In today's soci-
ety, however, one cannot rationalize this judicial preference for
protecting defendants. In many cases a defendant will have no via-
ble defense to the plaintiff's claim, and thus the court will be justi-
fied in entering a default judgment against him. In other cases the
defenses will be based on certain documents-for example, a check
or receipt to show payment of the obligation, or copies of the de-
fendant's income tax returns to prove his financial ability to pay
child support-that could be presented without the defendant's
having to appear in court. Moreover, the defendant will be insured
in the vast majority of tort cases; therefore, an insurance company
will reduce the defendant's burden by bearing a large portion of
116. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100-01 (1978).
117. In Kulko, both California and New York had enacted a version of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Id. at 98-99. The Court asserted that these statutes
provided both parties with an opportunity to resolve the controversy without either party
having to leave his home state. Id. at 99. Although these statutes theoretically do provide
such an opportunity, in practice the procedure frequently proves frustrating and futile. See
Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 12 FAM. L.Q. 113, 124-33
(1978). The statutes often facilitate a last-ditch effort to obtain child support, but they can-
not provide a viable alternative to a regular support proceeding when the location of the
father is known, and the father has sufficient earnings to provide at least minimal child
support. Thus, these acts do not justify overlooking the undue burden that is imposed on




the litigation costs. In still other cases the defendant may believe
that he has a valid defense. In these cases the use of existing tech-
nology such as video tapes or television may alleviate the burden of
defending an action in a distant forum. As the availability, employ-
ment, and judicial acceptance of these devices become more wide-
spread, the undue burden that is imposed on a nonresident defen-
dant will be diminished significantly.118
In sum, existing jurisdictional doctrines protect nonresident
defendants when, as a practical matter, they may not need to be
protected. Of course, many of the same considerations articulated
above may suggest that a plaintiff will sustain no undue burden by
having to prosecute an action in the distant state in which the de-
fendant resides. If, for example, the defendant has no defense and
permits a default judgment to be entered against him, the plaintiff
will have no need to travel to the defendant's state to litigate the
claim. Similarly, the plaintiff frequently may rely exclusively on
documentation to present his case and, therefore, will not have to
testify in the distant forum. Furthermore, the new devices for
presenting testimony are just as available to plaintiffs as they are
to defendants.
Although one could pose arguments and hypotheticals to
demonstrate that more plaintiffs than defendants will be subjected
to undue burdens and vice versa, this exercise would prove endless
and unnecessary. Rather than formulating across-the-board doc-
trines that penalize one party or the other in a particular case,
states should embrace jurisdictional doctrines that are flexible
enough to react to the facts of any case.
When an interest accommodation stalemate occurs, the deci-
sionmaker should ascertain the weight of the various states' inter-
ests in providing a forum. If the inquiry reveals that the initially
chosen forum state has a substantial interest in exercising jurisdic-
tion, it should possess the constitutional authority to resolve the
controversy. In the hypothetical just discussed, 119 for example,
California's substantial interest in providing adequate child sup-
118. Such devices will aid in the resolution of these types of cases only if one or more
of the interested states are willing to absorb the costs of utilizing them. To impose the costs
of such equipment on either the party desiring their employment or the losing party would
defeat their utility in the present context. Such an expenditure by the states must be viewed
as both reasonable and highly desirable.
Of course, "long-distance litigation" may be less desirable than litigation in the tradi-
tional mold. Any disadvantages of long-distance litigation, however, are more acceptable
than the imposition of an undue burden on either the plaintiff or defendant.
119. Sqe notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
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port to children residing in the state would tilt the balance of in-
terests in favor of California's constitutional authority to exercise
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, when the analysis reveals that a forum
state's interest in providing a forum is not substantial, the interest
accommodation stalemate remains. In these cases the plaintiff's
state of residence-or another interested forum that the plaintiff
selects-as well as the defendant's state of residence, should all
possess the constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction, unless
the defendant can demonstrate that his burden in defending the
action in the forum the plaintiff selected will be substantially
greater than the burden imposed on the plaintiff if the latter were
forced to prosecute the action in the defendant's state of residence.
If the defendant can demonstrate such a situation, then the origi-
nal forum state should defer to the jurisdiction of the defendant's
state of residence. If, however, the defendant cannot establish such
a disparity in burdens, no rational reason exists to prefer one inter-
ested state over another; they all should possess the constitutional
authority to exercise jurisdiction.
120
120. Becabse the plaintiff's state of residence will be an available forum under this
proposal in an increased number of cases, a danger exists that a plaintiff will fabricate a
factual situation to obtain a default judgment against a defendant in a distant state and
then rely on the full faith and credit clause to enforce the judgment. These fraudulent prac-
tices, of course, frustrate the interests of each state, as well as the collective community of
states, but the possibility of such conduct exists even under the minimum contacts ap-
proach. Thus, a plaintiff under the current law simply has to allege that the defendant en-
gaged in some activities within the forum state. Under existing jurisdictional doctrines, how-
ever, the defendant, if he did not appear in the action in the original forum, may
successfully attack the judgment when the plaintiff seeks to enforce it in the defendant's
home state on the ground that the original forum lacked jurisdiction over the defendant.
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958). Under the proposed theory of jurisdiction,
this attack may fail because the distant forum would have jurisdiction. The defendant, how-
ever, could attack the judgment for fraud, which courts traditionally have recognized as a
valid basis for a state's refusal to grant full faith and credit to a judgment of a sister state.
Unfortunately, the availability of the fraud defense is unclear under present doctrines. See
Pryles, The Impeachment of Sister State Judgments for Fraud, 25 Sw. L.J. 697 (1971). In
addition, in Christmas v. Russel, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866), the Supreme Court decided
that the rendering state's concept of fraud controls the determination whether fraud exists.
Id. at 303-07. These two aspects of the existing doctrines create the possibility that a
fabricated case would survive a subsequent attack based on fraud.
To avoid this possibility, Congress or the Supreme Court should adopt a uniform fed-
eral policy that authorizes a state to refuse to enforce a judgment when the defendant can
demonstrate that the judgment was based on fabricated facts. As a limitation on the appli-
cability of such a policy, the defendant would also have to show that defense in the state
which rendered the verdict would have imposed an undue burden on him. This uniform
federal policy should reduce the likelihood of a successful fraudulent claim. Moreover, a suit
against the plaintiff for malicious prosecution, which a steadily increasing majority of states
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(c) When the Controversy Relates to Resources Located in
Another State
The discussion to this point has not dealt with controversies in
which one state's interest in providing a forum arises because the
subject of the controversy is a resource that is located within its
boundaries. Because controversies over land within a state tradi-
tionally have created an especially strong interest on the part of
that state in resolving the dispute, this analysis focuses on these
particular controversies to determine whether the location of the
relevant resources should alter the accommodation of interests
that this Article has recommended.
The Supreme Court in Shaffer12 1 rejected the fiction that in
rem and quasi in rem actions are proceedings against property
rather than people. 12 2 Prior to Shaffer, courts had used this fiction
to justify an exercise of jurisdiction by a state in which property
was located-regardless of the location of the parties. The Shaffer
Court, however, quoted with approval the following statement by
Justice Holmes: "All proceedings, like all rights, are really against
persons. 1 2' Any rational jurisdictional theory must accept this
proposition. Such a theory also must balance the interests of both
the parties' states of residence and the state in which the land is
located. Just because land is the subject of a controversy does not
alter the results in the previous discussion concerning the exclusive
interests of the states in which the parties reside and the relevant
inclusive interests; all those interests remain at stake in the contro-
versy. Thus, courts should accommodate the relevant interests in
the manner recommended unless the interests of the state in which
the land is located dictate a different accommodation.
As several choice-of-law commentators have noted, courts fre-
quently exaggerate the interests of the state in which land is lo-
cated. 24 The state, of course, has interests in providing a forum for
the litigation of these controversies and in clearly establishing
recognizes, would provide an additional deterrent to these claims. See W. PROSSR, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (4th ed. 1971).
121. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see notes 24-25 supra and accompanying
text.
122. 433 U.S. at 207.
123. Id. at 207 n.22 (quoting Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E.
812, 814, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900)).
124. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8.22 (2d ed.
1980); Hancock, Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws: The
Disadvantages of Disingenuousness, 20 STAN. L. REv. (1967); Hancock, Equitable Conver-
sion and the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws, 17 STA. L. REv. 1095 (1965).
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ownership of land that is located within its boundaries. The former
of these two interests, however, carries no greater weight than the
interests of the states of residence of parties who are claiming own-
ership of or authority to use the land. As for the state's interest in
clearly establishing ownership of its land, a decision by a sister
state court usually will protect this interest as well as a decision by
its own courts. Several states recently have provided precisely this
type of protection of a neighboring state's interests,'125 even though
the full faith and credit clause does not compel them to do So.126
The judgment of the sister state, of course, must be recognized and
appropriately recorded before it would prejudice subsequent pur-
chasers or creditors.
12 7
In some actions dealing with land plaintiffs can join unknown
claimants as parties to ensure that the ownership question is re-
solved completely.12 8 The existence of these unknown claimants
should not alter the accommodation of interests that is suggested
here, since courts in another interested state can join unknown
claimants just as easily as those in the state in which the land is
located. Moreover, courts can require notice by publication in a
newspaper in the county in which the land is located to satisfy the
due process notice requirement enunciated in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,' 29 which entails providing notice that
is reasonably calculated under the circumstances to notify un-
known claimants of the suit. °30 As was noted earlier,'3 ' these notice
requirements-although they are an essential component of due
process-are separate and distinct from the issue of when a state
has the authority to exercise jurisdiction.
In sum, when land-and a fortiori other resources-is the sub-
ject of a controversy, the state in which the land is located consti-
tutes merely a potential forum that may or may not be the appro-
priate one in terms of the exclusive and inclusive interests at stake
125. See, e.g., Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Zorick -. Jones, 193
So. 2d 420 (Miss. 1966); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.J. Super. 18, 222 A.2d 120
(App. Div. 1966); McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961).
126. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
127. See 6A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 916 (1980).
128. This is, of course, the traditional in rem action in which unknown claimants can
be joined. See F. JAmEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.13 (2d ed. 1977). Such quiet
title or confirmation of title actions rarely will be precluded even after the Shaffer decision.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-09 (1977).
129. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
130. Id. at 314.
131. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
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in the particular controversy. If a forum state's decisionmakers be-
lieve the particular controversy can best be resolved by the courts
of the state in which the resource is located, it can voluntarily de-
fer to that state's authority to exercise jurisdiction.182 Similarly,
the state in which the events engendering the controversy occurred
should not emerge as the only proper forum. Courts should con-
sider this state as simply one available forum that may or may not
be the most suitable one in light of applicable exclusive and inclu-
sive interests.
2. An Interested Forum When Multiple Defendants or Multiple
Claimants Are Involved in the Controversy
(a) Multiple Defendants
The appropriate accommodation of the interests at stake in
state judicial jurisdiction controversies will vary as the numbers of
parties and interested states increase. When a case contains multi-
ple defendants, the characteristics of the various defendants may
differ greatly. If, however, their characteristics are similar, and the
forum that the plaintiff has selected will not impose an undue bur-
den on any of the defendants, then the forum state should possess
the authority to exercise jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the fo-
rum selected by the plaintiff does impose an undue burden on all
the defendants, one must determine whether another forum exists
in which none of the parties-either the plaintiff or the defen-
dants-will suffer an undue burden. If no such forum exists, the
appropriate accommodation of the interests at stake in the partic-
ular controversies requires a consideration of the defendants' resi-
dences or places of business.
When the defendants reside in a number of states, the inter-
ested forum state that the plaintiff has selected should possess the
authority to exercise jurisdiction over the entire controversy. This
conclusion promotes the inclusive interests both in resolving an en-
tire controversy in a single action and in economy for individuals
and states. When the defendants all reside in a single state, the
resolution of the controversy in either the plaintiff's or the defen-
dants' state of residence would promote the same inclusive inter-
ests. In this latter situation the plaintiff should proceed in the
132. Courts typically effectuate this deference by invoking the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. For a general discussion of this doctrine, see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, 35 CAiF. L. REv. 380 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
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* defendants' state of residence because the defendants' state's mul-
tiple, exclusive interests in protecting its residents from undue
burdens outweigh the plaintiff's state's single, exclusive interest in
protecting him from such burdens.3 s Of course, if multiple claim-
ants from the same or different states are involved in the contro-
versy, either the state that the claimants have selected or the
defendants' state should have jurisdiction to adjudicate the contro-
versy. The claimants undoubtedly will select the forum that they
believe will impose the least burden oh them as a group. This pre-
dictable pattern refutes the notion that to select the proper juris-
diction one simply should count the number of claimants and de-
fendants and require the claimants' state to yield jurisdiction
whenever the defendants outnumber the claimants. An appropriate
accommodation of conflicting interests does not require such math-
ematical precision. A forum should yield to another state only
when the forum's exercise of jurisdiction would deny a substan-
tially greater number of exclusive interests than it would promote.
If the characteristics of the multiple defendants vary signifi-
cantly, defending the action in the forum that the plaintiff has se-
lected may subject some but not others to an undue burden. When
this situation arises, one should determine first whether another
forum exists in which the controversy could be litigated without
subjecting any of the parties to an undue burden. If, for example,
the plaintiff files an action in the state in which the events en-
gendering the controversy occurred, and the plaintiff resides in a
state that is close in distance to the state in which the potentially
overburdened defendants reside, either the plaintiff's or the defen-
dants' home state may provide a forum in which none of the par-
ties will be burdened. If such a forum exists, the state that the
plaintiff has selected should yield to the jurisdiction of that forum.
Litigation in this mutually convenient state would promote not
only the exclusive and inclusive interests in protecting litigants
from having to litigate in an unduly burdensome forum, but also
the interests of the various states and the collective community of
states in promoting economy by resolving the controversy in a sin-
133. A plaintiff might file individual suits against the various defendants in his home
state in the hope of obtaining jurisdiction over all of them in that state. If this tactic is
attempted, any one of the defendants should be permitted to have all the actions dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Only in this manner can plaintiffs be deterred from attempting to
evade the proposed jurisdictional policies. If the actions are dismissed, the plaintiff will be




gle action. This latter interest negates the possibility of dismissing
the actions against the unduly burdened defendants and then pro-
ceeding against the remaining defendants in the forum that the
plaintiff has selected.
If no forum is available in which the parties can litigate the
controversy without subjecting one or more of them to an undue
burden, then the focus must shift to the claims that the plaintiff
has asserted against the various defendants. If the plaintiff has
sued the defendants in the alternative-which would create the
possibility that severing the claims would expose the claimant to
conflicting decisions-the -forum that the plaintiff has selected
should possess the authority to exercise jurisdiction. Although this
exercise of jurisdiction denies both the exclusive interests of the
states in which the overburdened defendants reside and the com-
parable inclusive interests of the collective community of states, to
deny the forum state jurisdiction would destroy the inclusive inter-
est in providing a single forum in which all those potentially re-
sponsible for a claimant's deprivations can be subjected to the ap-
plicable community policies. This inclusive interest warrants
primacy in these situations to prevent the unacceptable outcomes
that can occur when courts render conflicting decisions in a sev-
ered controversy. The promotion of this inclusive interest also
would avoid the type of dilemma presented in Buckeye Boiler.1
In addition, as was discussed above, in some situations courts can
employ certain techniques to alleviate substantially the burdens
that are imposed on a defendant by litigating in such a forum.135
On the other hand, if the plaintiff does not sue the various
defendants in the alternative, the inclusive interest in providing a
single forum should not control the determination of jurisdiction.
This situation, however, does not automatically justify severing the
claims against those defendants who will be subjected to an undue
burden. The question of severance, which would force the plaintiff
to seek other forums, depends first on the extent to which the
claims are factually interrelated. When the facts are closely related
and the defenses of the various defendants are identical or similar,
the initially chosen forum should exercise jurisdiction over the en-
tire controversy in a single action to promote the exclusive and in-
clusive interests in economy. When the facts are loosely related,
134. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969); see notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
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however, and the defendants' defenses vary widely, the possibility
exists that the claims against the overburdened defendants should
be severed. In making this determination a court should analyze
each defendant's situation as if only a single plaintiff and a single
defendant were involved in the case.136 If the analysis reveals that
the present forum should yield jurisdiction to another state, then
the court should sever the claims against this particular defendant.
If, however, the analysis reveals that the initially chosen forum
should possess the authority to adjudicate the claim, the court
should proceed to resolve the action against the defendant together
with the claims against those defendants who are not subjected to
an undue burden.
(b) Multiple Claimants
When multiple claimants are involved in the controversy, they
ordinarily can agree on a forum that will be the most convenient
for them as a group. If they cannot reach agreement, however, two
possibilities exist: those claimants who believe that the forum
which a majority of the group has selected is unacceptable can re-
fuse to join in the action and file suit in a forum that they find
acceptable, or the dissatisfied group may select certain members to
represent them in a class action.1 37 However they proceed, the ap-
propriate analysis for determining jurisdiction is the same as when
only a single claimant is involved in the controversy. Thus, if liti-
gation in the forum that the claimants have selected will not over-
burden any defendant, then that forum should resolve the contro-
versy. If one or more of the defendants will be unduly burdened,
the parties should seek a forum in which litigation will not unduly
burden any defendants or claimants. If this pursuit is successful,
the state that the claimants have selected should defer to the juris-
diction of the more convenient forum.
In the absence of such an option, the determination of the ap-
propriate forum or forums depends on the plaintiffs' claims and
the interrelationship of the facts. If the plaintiffs are suing the de-
fendants in the alternative, or the facts are closely interrelated, the
forum that the plaintiffs have selected should resolve the contro-
versy. This arrangement promotes the inclusive interests in judicial
economy and in providing a forum in which courts can apply com-
136. See notes 115-20 supra and accompanying text.
137. For references to the statutes and court rules that authorize these actions, see 1
H. NEWBERG, supra note 100, §§ 1220-1220b.
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munity policies in a single action. 138 If neither of these situations
exist, the court should consider severing the actions against those
defendants who will be overburdened, taking into account the bur-
dens that will be imposed on each claimant and each defendant.
3. A Disinterested Forum
This Article has already identified four situations in which a
suit in a disinterested forum may accommodate most appropriately
the exclusive and inclusive interests at stake in a controversy. The
first situation exists in a case between a single plaintiff and a single
defendant when the forum that the plaintiff has selected would im-
pose an undue burden on the defendant, and suit in other inter-
ested forums would impose an undue burden on either the defen-
dant or the plaintiff.'3 9 In this situation a disinterested forum in
which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant would be subjected to
an undue burden may be available. If, for example, the plaintiff is
an Indiana resident and the defendant is a resident of New York, a
suit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania-a city that is approximately
halfway between the residences of the parties-conceivably may
impose no undue burden on either party. Although a Pennsylvania
court's exercise of jurisdiction in such a case would defeat the ex-
clusive interests of Indiana and New York in providing a forum, it
would promote the exclusive and inclusive interests in protecting
both parties from an undue burden. These latter interests deserve
primacy in cases of this kind, since the interests in protecting both
parties from undue burdens outweigh the parties' home states' in-
terest in providing a forum for the resolution of the controversy.
Because states maintain judicial systems primarily for the res-
olution of their residents' controversies, a disinterested forum may
not wish to provide a forum for a controversy between nonresi-
138. Courts need not separate this kind of case into multiple actions to ensure that
only a minimal number of the defendants will be subjected to an undue burden. Those
defendants who will not be subjected to a burden will represent adequately the overall class
of defendants on common questions of law and fact. This representation should relieve
most, if not all, of the burden that would be imposed on those defendants who would suffer
if they were forced to present the common defenses themselves. In those situations in which
issues exist that are peculiar to a particular defendant, forcing the plaintiffs to sever these
claims and resolve them in some other forum would create complex problems by forcing
other state courts to become familiar with all that has transpired in the initial forum. Al-
though a court could proceed in such a manner, some claimants would be subjected to an
undue burden in these cases, and the potential harm from this burden outweighs the bene-
fits of severing the claims.
139. See notes 115-20 supra and accompanying text.
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dents. In these cases, however, an exercise of jurisdiction by the
disinterested forum will accommodate the common interests most
appropriately; the full faith and credit clause, therefore, should re-
quire the disinterested state to provide a forum in its courts that
are otherwise competent-according to its laws-to hear such a
case. In Broderick v. Rosner140 the Supreme Court stated,
The power of a State to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts
and the character of the controversies which shall be heard therein is subject
to the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution.... A "State cannot
escape its constitutional obligations [under the full faith and credit clause] by
the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts otherwise
competent.'
4'
Thus, a disinterested state, if it is a convenient forum, constitu-
tionally should be able to refuse to exercise jurisdiction only in
rare instances.
142
The second situation in which a disinterested state may be the
most appropriate forum for promoting relevant exclusive and in-
clusive interests occurs when a single plaintiff selects a forum that
will impose an undue burden on each of the multiple defen-
dants.143 The third situation arises when a single plaintiff has se-
lected a forum that will impose an undue burden on only some of
the multiple defendants. 44 In both of these situations, a disinter-
ested state may exist in which neither the plaintiff nor any of the
defendants will be overburdened. If such a disinterested forum ex-
ists, it should resolve the controversy, since to do so would pro-
mote the exclusive and inclusive interests in protecting parties
from an undue burden, the interests in providing a single forum
for the resolution of interrelated controversies, and the interests in
state and individual economy. Of course, the disinterested forum's
exercise of jurisdiction contravenes the other states' interests in
providing a forum. The interests that such an exercise of jurisdic-
tion promotes, however, outweigh these exclusive interests.
The fourth situation in which jurisdiction might belong in a
disinterested state arises when multiple claimants and multiple de-
fendants are involved in the controversy, and the forum that the
plaintiffs have selected will impose an undue burden on one or
140. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
141. Id. at 642 (quoting Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 415 (1920) (citations
omitted)). See also Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
142. The Broderick Court identified one such instance: a state need not enforce the
penal laws of a sister state. 294 U.S. at 642.
143. See notes 133-35 supra and accompanying text.
144. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
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more of the defendants. 145 Again, a disinterested forum may exist
in which none of the plaintiffs or the defendants will suffer an un-
due burden. If so, that forum should exercise jurisdiction because
it will-for the same reasons cited in the second and third situa-
tions-accommodate most appropriately the interests at stake in
the controversy.
Although the discussion above presumed that the claimants
initially selected an interested forum, the original filing in a disin-
terested forum should be not only possible but encouraged. This
filing would require only one jurisdictional inquiry, and in many
cases it would impose no burden on any of the parties during the
resolution of the jurisdictional issue itself.
Yet another situation exists in which a disinterested forum
should exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate: trans-state controversies
in which no state has an interest in the controversy. For example,
two United States citizens, who are both domiciled in Canada, may
execute a contract in this country to be performed in this country.
If a controversy arises over the contract, no state may have an in-
terest in providing a forum or in protecting the parties. In these
situations the exercise of jurisdiction by a disinterested forum pro-
motes the inclusive interest in providing at least bne forum in
which a controversy can be resolved-so long as the suit is filed in
a timely manner.
14
4. A Response to Two Potential Criticisms of a Systematic
Interest Analysis Theory
Two potential criticisms of the theory suggested in this Article
warrant special consideration. First, some critics might argue that
the approach may encourage forum shopping by claimants. Admit-
tedly, the theory may increase the number of forums that are
available in some controversies. For example, when at least one
party will be unduly burdened in each available forum, and the
parties will be subjected to approximately the same burden in all
145. See notes 137-38 supra and accompanying text.
146. Many jurisdictional controversies arise because a plaintiff has failed to file an
action within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations in one or more interested
states. The frustrated plaintiff may attempt to select another forum-which may or may not
have an interest in deciding the case-in which the statute of limitations has not run. Cer-
tain choice-of-law theories encourage this forum shopping by characterizing statutes of limi-
tations as procedural law. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 124, § 3.2C2. A more rational
approach, however, is to treat statutes of limitations as substantive law and apply the stat-
ute that best promotes the relevant policies and interests. See id. This alternative approach,
of course, would severely limit forum shopping to avoid statutes of limitations.
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the potential forums, the claimant may file suit in his state of resi-
dence even when the defendant had no minimum contacts with
that state. Criticisms of jurisdictional doctrines on the ground that
they permit forum shopping usually spring from an assumption
that different forums will apply dissimilar policies to resolve the
same types of controversies. 147 Although courts indeed tend to pre-
fer and apply the policies of the state in which they preside, 148 that
fact alone fails to support a criticism based on a theory's potential
for encouraging forum shopping.14 9 Moreover, in the overwhelming
majority of cases the appropriate employment of most contempo-
rary choice-of-law theories will not produce divergent decisions in
different forums.1 50 Only Currie's governmental interest analysis
theory would necessarily result in inconsistent outcomes, and this
result would be true only in certain types of cases. 51 As states be-
come less provincial in their outlook on choice-of-law issues, claim-
ants' forum shopping will decrease proportionately in significance.
In the meantime, commentators who fear forum shopping should
focus their analysis on a modification of choice-of-law theory and
practice, not jurisdictional theories.
A second potential criticism of the interest analysis theory is
that it fails to consider the substantive interests of a potential fo-
rum in applying its laws to resolve a particular controversy. 52 Sub-
stantive interests, however, are not concerned with the question
147. A prime example of such forum shopping can be found in Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981). The Constitution limits a state's authority to apply its law
to a controversy. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. The Hague case demonstrates that the scope of
due process limitations in this context is far from clear. Note, however, that the Supreme
Court places far greater stress on interests in those cases than it does in jurisdictional cases.
See 101 S. Ct. 633.
148. See Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis
and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181, 227-33 (1977).
149. A perusal of any conflict-of-laws casebook reveals a fairly sizeable number of
cases in which the forum applied law other than that of its own state-even when the forum
state was an interested state. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12
Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1961); Casey v. Monson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
150. For a brief outline of most of the contemporary choice-of-law theories, as well as
an appraisal of the extent to which they encourage the application of the forum's law, see
McDougal, supra note 39, at 242-57.
151. For both an outline and a criticism of Currie's theory, see id. at 237-42. See also
McDougal, supra note 106, at 449-50.
152. All the commentators cited in note 55 supra suggest that substantive interests
should play some role in jurisdictional decisions. Some commentators suggest that substan-
tive policies either have played or should play a role in jurisdictional decisions. See, e.g., R.
CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 52, at 557; Woods, supra note 55, at 896-97
(limited usually only to a forum's choice-of-law rules).
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whether a state has the authority to exercise judicial jurisdiction;
rather, their focus is on the question of what policy to apply after
the state is held to have the authority to exercise jurisdiction. In
other words, jurisdictional policies and interests seek to allocate
judicial business in trans-state controversies properly; substantive
interests deal with the application of the appropriate policies to
resolve trans-state controversies. Substantive interests reflect de-
mands and expectations that have nothing to do with the selection
of a forum. They are significant in jurisdictional disputes only to
the extent that they help determine the strength of a state's inter-
est in providing a forum.
C. An Application of the Interest Analysis Theory to Selected
Supreme Court Decisions
1. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.163
In McGee plaintiff, a California resident, filed suit against de-
fendant International Life Insurance Company to recover on a life
insurance policy that the Empire Mutual Insurance Company had
originally issued. International Life had assumed the insurance ob-
ligations of Empire Mutual, and the insured, plaintiff's son, had
accepted International Life's offer, which had been mailed to him
in California, to insure him on the same terms that Empire Mu-
tual's original policy had contained. International Life later re-
fused to pay on the policy because it believed that the son had
committed suicide, a cause of death which was expressly excluded
from the policy's coverage.
After determining that the insurance contract had a substan-
tial connection with California, the Court recognized California's
interest in providing a forum and the severe damage its residents
would incur if they were forced to sue insurance companies in a
distant state. The Court stated,
When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could
not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect
making the company judgment proof.... Of course there may be inconve-
nience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had
this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due
process.
15
The Court, albeit in terminology that was slightly different from
153. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
154. Id. at 223-24. The first of these sentences clearly focuses on the undue burdens
imposed on a plaintiff forced to litigate in a foreign forum; the second sentence stresses the
mere "inconvenience" imposed on defendant by defending the action in California.
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that which this Article has employed, concluded in effect that
while plaintiff would be subjected to an undue burden if forced to
litigate in defendant's state of residence, defendant would not be
subjected to an undue burden if required to defend the action in
plaintiff's state of residence. 155 It concluded that California prop-
erly could exercise jurisdiction.156 This conclusion appropriately
accommodated the interests at stake in the controversy. The
Court's decision promoted both California's interest in protecting
its residents from having to litigate in an unduly burdensome fo-
rum and the inclusive interest in protecting all litigants from being
unduly burdened. Furthermore, the decision frustrated only the in-
terest of the defendant's home state in providing a forum. Thus,
the Supreme Court's decision in McGee is the same decision that
would have been reached if the Court had employed the interest
analysis theory presented in this Article.
2. Hanson v. Denckla
57
One year after McGee, the Supreme Court in Hanson for the
most part abandoned the approach it had taken in the earlier deci-
sion. By announcing the "purposefully availing" requirement, 58
the Court adopted a view of jurisdiction that was even more terri-
torially oriented than the International Shoe approach. In Hanson
Mrs. Donner, then a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, executed a trust
instrument in 1935 in which she designated the Wilmington Trust
Company of Delaware as trustee. She reserved a life interest in the
income from the trust and provided that the corpus of the trust be
distributed on her death to whomsoever she should appoint by an
inter vivos or testamentary instrument. Mrs. Donner moved to
Florida in 1944, but she maintained regular communication with
the trust company. 59 In 1949 she executed an inter vivos power of
appointment distributing $200,000 of the trust's corpus to each of
two trusts that her daughter, Elizabeth Hanson, had previously
created for the benefit of her own two children and their issue. The
Delaware Trust Company oversaw both of these trusts as trustee.
The power of appointment also made small appointments in favor
155. Id.
156. Id. at 224.
157. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
158. See note 161 infra and accompanying text.
159. Justice Black emphasized this fact in his dissenting opinion. 357 U.S. at 259
(Black, J., dissenting). The majority, however, dismissed it as "several bits of trust adminis-
tration." Id. at 252.
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of a hospital and six servants. Mrs. Donner appointed the balance
of the Wilmington Trust Company trust corpus-in excess of
$1,000,000-to her executrix for a distribution that would be con-
sistent with the residuary clause of her will. Mrs. Donner died in
1952, and her will was admitted to probate in Florida. In the pro-
bate proceeding the residuary legatees asserted that the inter vivos
power of appointment executed in Florida was not effectively exer-
cised, and that, therefore, the funds should pass to them under the
residuary clause.
The issue in Hanson was whether Florida constitutionally
could exercise jurisdiction over the Delaware trustees-the
$400,000 had been paid to the Delaware Trust Company shortly
after Mrs. Donner's death-the hospital, the servants, and certain
potential beneficiaries, none of whom was a resident of Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court held that "jurisdiction to construe the
will carried with it 'substantive' jurisdiction 'over the persons of
the absent defendants' even though the trust assets were not
'physically in this state.' "160 The United States Supreme Court,
however, disagreed and stated that "it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 161 The
Court concluded that the Wilmington Trust Company was not
subject to Florida jurisdiction because it had performed no "pur-
posefully availing" act. Since the majority determined that the
trustee was an indispensable party to this type of action under
Florida law, 62 it reversed the Florida judgment against all the par-
ties, including those who resided in Florida.
Because the Hanson decision turned on Florida's ability to ob-
tain jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, any analysis of the case
initially must focus on the controversy between the residuary lega-
tees and the Delaware trustee. Under an interest analysis, both
Florida and Delaware possessed an interest in providing a forum
for the resolution of the controversy, since Florida was the state of
residence of the primary beneficiaries in the allegedly invalid
power of appointment, and Delaware was the state of residence of
160. Id. at 243.
161. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
162. Id. at 254. Justices Black, Burton, and Brennan argued in dissent that even if the
majority was right in its jurisdictional holding, the issue whether the trustee was an indis-




the trustee and the location of the trust funds. Because Florida
had such an interest, the question would be whether forcing the
Delaware trustee to defend the action in Florida would infringe
upon Delaware's interest in protecting its residents from an undue
burden. One cannot contend persuasively that one of Delaware's
larger financial institutions6 " would have been unduly burdened
by defending an action in Florida. Such a contention would be
even more untenable in the Hanson case because the Delaware
trustee was a disinterested party whose role in the litigation should
have been minimal.
164
Since Florida thus was an interested state and the trust com-
pany would not have been subjected to an undue burden, the
Court should have sustained Florida's jurisdiction over the Wil-
mington Trust Company. Once the Court made that decision, the
issue would be whether Florida possessed the authority to exercise
jurisdiction over all the nonresident defendants. Although the Del-
aware Trust Company is a smaller financial institution than the
Wilmington Trust Company, 6 5 it certainly is not so small that de-
fending an action in Florida would have overburdened it. Unfortu-
nately, the opinion does not mention any facts about the residence
or characteristics of the other defendants. 6 Some of the defen-
dants such as Mrs. Donner's former servants would have suffered
an undue burden if they had been forced to defend the action in
Florida and had resided in a distant state. Thus, if no interested
forum existed in which all the parties could have participated
without having been subjected to an undue burden, then the ques-
tion would be whether the claims against the overburdened defen-
dants should be severed from the other claims. All the claims in
Hanson hinged on the same facts, and the potential defenses avail-
able to the various defendants thus were either identical or very
similar. Therefore, the inclusive interests both in resolving an in-
terrelated controversy in a single action and in judicial and indi-
163. As of December 31, 1979, the Wilmington Trust Company's total assets equalled
$1,392,526,000. 1 AM. BANK DIRECTORY, Del. 7 (Spring 1980). Although the assets probably
were less when this litigation occurred, the trust company obviously was not a struggling
financial institution.
164. Justice Douglas emphasized this factor in his dissenting opinion. 357 U.S. at 263
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
165. As of December 31, 1979, the Delaware Trust Company had total assets of
$551,337,000. 1 AM. BANK DIRECTORY, Del. 9 (Spring 1980).
166. The hospital was the Bryn Mawr Hospital located in Pennsylvania. Brief for Ap-
pellants at 7, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The briefs, however, do not disclose
the residence of all the servants, three of whom were not even made defendants. Id.
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vidual economy support a conclusion under an interest analysis
that Florida should have had the authority to exercise jurisdiction
over all the defendants.
67
3. Shaffer v. Heitner6 8
Almost two decades elapsed after Hanson before the Supreme
Court made another definitive statement on the question of judi-
cial jurisdiction. In Shaffer the Court effectively eliminated the
distinction between in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam causes
of action by extending the International Shoe protections to all
state court exercises of jurisdiction. 69 Although this aspect of the
Court's holding is praiseworthy, the later portion of the opinion, in
which the court applied the minimum contacts test to the facts in
Shaffer, probably failed to accommodate appropriately the inter-
ests at stake in the case.
In Shaffer plaintiff, a nonresident of Delaware who owned one
share of Greyhound Corporation stock, filed a shareholder's deriva-
tive action in Delaware against the corporation, its wholly owned
subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Incorporated, and twenty-eight past
and present officers and directors of the corporation and its subsid-
iary. Although Greyhound Corporation was a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Arizona, none of the individ-
ual defendants resided in Delaware. Plaintiff alleged that the of-
ficers and directors violated their fiduciary duties to Greyhound by
causing the corporations to engage in activities in Oregon that ulti-
mately exposed the corporation and its subsidiary to a $13,000,000
antitrust judgment and criminal contempt fines of $600,000. The
Supreme Court held that the individual defendants had no mini-
mum contacts with Delaware, and that Delaware's exercise of juris-
diction thus conflicted with the due process limitations on state
167. Ultimately the two daughters who had already received more than $500,000 each
would have prevailed because Mrs. Donner's inter vivos power of appointment was invalid.
This result obviously defeats the decedent's expectations about the distribution of her es-
tate and, therefore, is unsatisfactory. On the other hand, to distort jurisdictional policies to
avoid an inequitable result in a single case is even more unacceptable, since it only serves to
penalize future plaintiffs. Even if a desire to avoid an unjust result is not what motivated
the Hanson Court, which is unlikely, the decision is still unacceptable because it fails to
accommodate the interests at stake appropriately-unless one assumes that no party would
have been subjected to an undue burden in a Delaware forum. Considering the wealth of the
plaintiffs, this assumption would be quite reasonable.
168. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).




Because Greyhound was incorporated in Delaware, under an
interest analysis theory that state possessed an interest in provid-
ing a forum for the resolution of the controversy. Since the initially
chosen forum had such an interest, therefore, the question under
the theory would be whether one or more of the individual defen-
dants would suffer an undue burden by defending the action in
Delaware. In Shaffer the individual defendants resided in states
located in almost every region of the country.171 Since Greyhound
is a major national corporation, and since a national corporation's
officers and directors usually are selected for their business acu-
men, one can assume that all Greyhound's officers and directors
were relatively wealthy individuals. If this assumption is correct,
then Delaware's exercise of jurisdiction in Shaffer would not have
overburdened any of the defendants and would have contravened
only the equivalent interests of other states in providing a forum.
If the assumption is incorrect, however, then some of the defen-
dants would have suffered an undue burden if the Court had
forced them to litigate in Delaware. The question then would be
whether an alternate forum-interested or disinterested-existed
in which this burden could be eliminated. Because of the lack of
information on the individual defendants' characteristics, however,
one cannot determine whether such a forum existed. If it did, then
under an interest analysis theory Delaware would have to yield ju-
risdiction because the other forum could adjudicate the dispute
with a minimal effect on the exclusive and inclusive interests at
stake in the controversy. If no such forum existed, however, the
question would be whether the claims against the overburdened
defendants should be severed. Although the opinion does not de-
tail all the plaintiff's claims or all the defendants' defenses, the
facts and potential defenses that were relevant to the various de-
fendants likely were either very similar or identical. If so, an inter-
est analysis theory would dictate that Delaware should have the
authority to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the entire contro-
versy and thereby promote the inclusive interests in judicial and
individual economy. If the facts and defenses were only loosely re-
lated, however, the theory would require that the claims against
170. Id. at 213-17.
171. Nine defendants resided in Arizona, eight in California, three in New York, two
in Connecticut, and one each in Texas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Oklahoma.
The residence of the other defendant was unknown. Appendix to Appellant's Jurisdictional
Statement at A26, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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the defendants subjected to an undue burden should have been
severed for litigation in other, more appropriate forums.
One other facet of the Shaffer opinion requires specific consid-
eration. The Court in Shaffer placed considerable emphasis on the
absence of a Delaware statute that expressly sanctioned the com-
petence of its courts to exercise jurisdiction over officers and direc-
tors of Delaware corporations. In fact, the Court hinted that it
would have sustained jurisdiction if Delaware had had a statute
that, like some states, "treats acceptance of a directorship as con-
sent to jurisdiction in the State. 1 72 Because Delaware undoubtedly
possesses an interest in providing a forum to resolve controversies
like the one in Shaffer, the presence or absence of a specific juris-
dictional statute should be irrelevant. No reason exists to require
state legislatures to consider and enact long lists of special jurisdic-
tional statutes that expressly assert their state's interests in pro-
viding forums for various types of controversies. In addition, be-
cause the issue in these cases concerns the limitation that the due
process clause imposes on state authority, the relevance of a spe-
cific state statute is difficult to comprehend; states cannot change
the scope or content of due process limitations merely by enacting
a statute.
This facet of the Shaffer opinion poses another, more signifi-
cant question: When should a defendant, who will be subjected to
an undue burden if forced to litigate in a particular forum, be con-
sidered to have waived any objections to the state's jurisdiction by
acts or statements arising prior to the controversy? The fictional
consent statutes, which can more accurately be described as acqui-
escence statutes, are not definitive on the question. 17  These stat-
172. 433 U.S. at 216.
173. Nonresident motorist statutes were constitutionally upheld in Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927), and are a common type of fictional consent statute. The statute in Hess
provided that a nonresident who operated a motor vehicle upon the public highways of the
state appointed the state registrar as his agent for service of process for any case or action
arising out of an accident on those highways. Id. at 354. The officers' and directors' consent
statutes are couched in similar terms. They provide that a nonresident who accepts election
or appointment as a director-and in some states an officer of an organization incorporated
in the state-thereby consents to service of process on the corporation's registered agent, or,
if the corporation has no registered agent, on the secretary of state. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1980) (enacted by the Delaware legislature shortly after Shaffer).
The Supreme Court recognized the fictious nature of the consent in nonresident motorist
statutes in 01berding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953). The Court stated,
It is true that in order to ease the process by which new decisions are fitted into
pre-existing modes of analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect that the
reason why a non-resident can be subjected to a state's jurisdiction is that the non-
resident has "impliedly" consented to be sued there. In point of fact, however, juris-
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utes wrongly presume not only that certain defendants consent to
the jurisdiction of the state, but also that "everyone is presumed to
know the law." Although this maxim may be valuable in some con-
texts, it is an inappropriate standard for determining due process
protections, particularly when more satisfactory alternatives exist.
Because of the weight of the constitutional interests that are impli-
cated in these situations, a waiver of due process protections prior
to the emergence of a controversy should require an explicit waiver
based on actual knowledge. For example, although some corporate
directors may understand that their position subjects them to the
jurisdiction of the state in which the corporation was incorporated,
many may not. Requiring incoming directors and officers to exe-
cute a form which states that they realize the state of incorpora-
tion can exercise jurisdiction over them in controversies concerning
the corporation's activities would provide them with actual knowl-
edge of their waiver and would more closely comport with tradi-
tional due process notions of fairness. A knowing waiver provides a
better approach to this issue than the implied consent fiction that
the Court rejected in another context in International Shoe.17 4 Al-
though the proposed procedure will increase considerably the
amount of paperwork in states such as Delaware in which a large
number of organizations incorporate, meaningful due process pro-
tection warrants such a price. 175
4. Kulko v. Superior Court
17 6
The facts in Kulko were that Ezra and Sharon Kulko were
married in 1959 in California while Ezra was en route from Texas
to Korea for a military tour of duty. Immediately after the mar-
riage, Sharon returned to New York, and Ezra joined her there
later after his discharge from the military. The couple remained in
diction in these cases does not rest on consent at all .... The defendant may protest
to high heaven his unwillingness to be sued and it avails him not.
Id. at 340-41 (emphasis added). These observations are equally applicable to the corporate
director consent statutes. Therefore, such statutes are more appropriately labeled as acqui-
escence statutes because the nonresident has acquiesced in the state's jurisdiction by oper-
ating a motor vehicle in the state or agreeing to serve as a director of an organization incor-
porated in the state; he has not voluntarily consented to the state's jurisdiction.
174. For a discussion of the impact of International Shoe on these fictive concepts,
see Kurland, supra note 9, at 573-90.
175. The Court in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972), and
Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 200 (1972), indicated that it would sustain a contractual
waiver of due process protections only if the waiver was both voluntary and informed.
176. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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New York until they were separated in 1972, at which time Sharon
moved to California. Ezra and Sharon entered into a separation
agreement providing, inter alia, that, except for school vacations,
their two children-Darwin and Ilsa-would live in New York with
Ezra. He agreed to pay three thousand dollars per year in child
support for those periods in which the children visited their
mother in California. Sharon flew from California to New York to
execute the agreement; she then flew to Haiti and procured a
divorce.
In 1973 Ilsa decided that she wanted to live with her mother.
The father agreed and bought her an airplane ticket to California.
In 1976 Darwin also decided he wanted to live with his mother. He
advised her of his decision, and she sent him an airplane ticket.
The mother subsequently filed suit in California seekii g, among
other relief, an increase in Ezra's support payments. Ezra, how-
ever, objected to California's exercise of jurisdiction over him to
adjudicate the increased child support claim. The California courts
overruled his objections on the ground that the defendant had
caused an "effect" in the state.17 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, since the father had not purposefully derived
"benefit from any activities relating to the State of California."17 8
Under an interest analysis theory, California, as the state of
residence of both the mother and the children, clearly had an in-
terest in providing a forum for the resolution of the child support
controversy. Thus, the question would be whether California's ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would impose an undue
burden on him. It appears that Ezra Kulko had not engaged in
sufficient activities in California to conclude on that basis alone
that defending the action in California would not overburden him.
Although the Court did not discuss Ezra Kulko's wealth, three
facts suggest that litigation in California would not have imposed
an undue burden on him. First, the case was appealed through the
California court system and then to the United States Supreme
Court. The expenses incurred in such extensive litigation certainly
suggest that Ezra Kulko was not a poor man. Second, the separa-
tion agreement provided three thousand dollars per year in child
support payments to the mother, even though the children were to
stay with her approximately only three months out of the year.
177. Id. at 89.
178. Id. at 96.
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Last, Ezra Kulko was a dentist.179 Since these facts suggest that he
would not have been subjected to an undue burden by defending
the action in California, the Court should have upheld California's
exercise of jurisdiction under an interest analysis theory. Such an
exercise of jurisdiction would not contravene any exclusive or in-
clusive interest other than New York's equivalent interest in pro-
viding a forum. Furthermore, even if litigating in California would
have subjected the defendant to an undue burden, California's
strong interest in resolving its residents' child support controver-
sies would justify the exercise of jurisdiction.180
5. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson"8"
In World-Wide Volkswagen Harry and Kay Robinson, who
were both New York residents, purchased a new Audi automobile
in 1976 from Seaway Volkswagen, Incorporated, in New York. The
following year, while the Robinsons were moving to Arizona, a car
ran into their Audi as they were driving through Oklahoma. A fire
broke out and severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children.
The Robinsons subsequently filed a products liability action in
Oklahoma claiming that the defective design and placement of the
Audi's gas tank and fuel system had in part caused their injuries.
The suit.named the following parties as defendants: Audi NSU
Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, the manufacturer; Volkswagen of
America, Incorporated, the importer; World-Wide Volkswagen
Corporation, the regional distributor for New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut; and Seaway Volkswagen, Incorporated, the
dealer.
All the defendants objected to Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdic-
tion, but the trial court overruled their objections. The regional
distributor and the dealer sought a writ of prohibition182 from the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The court denied the writ based on
179. Brief for Appellee at 2 n.1, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
180. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
181. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
182. Because the final judgment rule requires a final judgment by a trial court before a
party can appeal any ruling by a trial judge, a party is precluded from appealing a trial
court's decision sustaining its authority to exercise jurisdiction until after the trial of the
case and the entry of a final judgment. Some states, rather than authorizing an interlocutory
appeal, permit a party to seek a writ of prohibition which, if issued by an appellate court,
would prohibit the trial judge from doing a specific act, such as proceeding to try the case
when the court lacked judicial jurisdiction. See D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE 13 (4th ed. 1979). This procedure is authorized in Oklahoma by OKLA. CONST.
art. 7, § 4.
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an inference that both petitioners "derive substantial income from
automobiles which from time to time are used in the State of
Oklahoma. 1 8 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding
"a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a neces-
sary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction."1
Since none of the parties resided in Oklahoma, the initial
question under an interest analysis theory would be whether
Oklahoma possessed a valid, as opposed to a presumed,8 5 interest
in providing a forum for the resolution of the controversy. Signifi-
cantly, Kay Robinson and her children spent more than five
months in a Tulsa hospital recovering from the severe burns that
they suffered in the automobile fire.18 Plaintiffs' attorneys alleged
that the plaintiffs were "pauperized" as a result of the hospital and
medical expenses that they had incurred. 87 Under these circum-
stances, the only logical conclusion is that Oklahoma possessed an
interest in providing a forum for the resolution of the controversy
both to aid in the timely payment of any unpaid hospital and doc-
tors bills and to help compensate plaintiffs for the enormous ex-
penses that they had incurred as the result of an accident on an
Oklahoma highway.
Since Oklahoma thus had an interest in providing a forum, the
issue under an interest analysis theory would be whether having to
litigate the controversy in Oklahoma would subject the defendants
to an undue burden. Although the briefs and opinions contain no
mention of the assets, liabilities, or annual earnings of either the
regional distributor or the New York dealer, one can infer-in the
absence of evidence to the contrary-that defense of the action
would not have overburdened either of these defendants, since
they both almost surely possessed adequate financial resources. In
his dissenting opinion Justice Blackmun alluded to another factor
that also would negate a contention that these defendants would
have been unduly burdened: the various defendants' insurance
companies were really the true interested parties in the case.188
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, therefore, could have
183. 444 U.S. at 290 (quoting from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585
P.2d 351, 354 (1978)).
184. Id. at 295.
185. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
186. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma,
Brief of Respondent at 3, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
187. Id. at 22.




applied an interest analysis and held that Oklahoma had the au-
thority to exercise jurisdiction in the case. The only interest that
such a holding would have defeated was New York's equivalent in-
terest in providing a forum for the resolution of the controversy. In
addition, Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over all the defen-
dants would have promoted the inclusive interest in economy.
Moreover, if defendants really were blaming one another for plain-
tiffs' injuries, then Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction also would
have promoted the inclusive interest in providing a single forum
for defendants who may be alternatively responsible for the claim-
ants' deprivations.
6. Rush v. Savchuk1
89
In Rush, which was decided the same day as World-Wide
Volkswagen, Minnesota attempted to obtain jurisdiction over a
controversy by proceeding directly against the injuror's insurance
company rather than against the injuror himself. Plaintiff, who was
a passenger in the allegedly negligent party's car, was injured in a
single-car accident in Indiana. Both plaintiff and the injuror
resided in Indiana at the time of the accident. Approximately
eighteen months after the incident, however, plaintiff moved to
Minnesota with his parents. After the Indiana statute of limita-
tions had run, plaintiff filed suit in Minnesota, relying on a Minne-
sota garnishment statute to support that state's jurisdiction over
the controversy. 190 The statute authorized Minnesota residents to
garnish a defendant's insurance policy proceeds even when the ac-
cident generating the claim against the insured occurred outside of
Minnesota. The insurance company objected to Minnesota's juris-
diction, but the Minnesota courts overruled its objections. 191 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's holding on the jurisdiction issue on the ground that the in-
juror had never had any contacts with Minnesota, even though the
defendant insurance company regularly did business in this
state.
92
An interest analysis initially would focus on the question
whether a state has a valid, as opposed to a presumed, interest in
providing a forum for the resolution of a controversy when the de-
189. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
190. MINN. STAT. § 571.41 (2) (1978), quoted in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 322-23
n.3.
191.- 444 U.S. at 324.
192. Id. at 328.
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fendant's insurance company does business in that state. In the
Rush case, of course, the state legislature had expressly asserted
such an interest. Nevertheless, the issue remains whether the ex-
pectations supporting this interest are realistic in terms of an ap-
propriate allocation of judicial business among the states.193 From
a realistic perspective, one cannot ignore the existence of potential
insurance proceeds in a tort action; in most litigation a defendant's
insurance status frequently plays a major role, among other things,
in the initial determination of whether to file suit, in subsequent
decisions concerning a settlement of the action, and in the plotting
of strategy for the presentation of the plaintiff's case. To assert
that every state has an interest in providing a forum to resolve any
controversy in which the defendant is insured by a national insur-
ance company, however, is unrealistic. Every state establishes pre-
requisites that an insurance company must meet before it can en-
gage in business in the state.194 States, for example, may require
minimum amounts of capital, reserves, and deposits to ensure the
liquidity of the company. 195 In addition, losses on policies issued in
any particular state primarily determine the premiums that insur-
ance companies charge residents of that state. 196 Thus, a state does
not have an interest in providing a forum to resolve a controversy
simply because the defendant's insurance company does business
there, since the outcome of the controversy does not affect signifi-
cantly the insurance company's operation in that state. This con-
clusion is most clear when none of the parties resides in the forum
state and the events engendering the controversy arose elsewhere.
In Rush the defendant insurance company conducted business
in Minnesota, and the plaintiff began residing in that state prior to
the commencement of the action. An interest analysis, therefore,
would focus on the question whether Minnesota had an interest in
providing a forum, since plaintiff, who was not a resident of Min-
nesota when he sustained the injury, was a resident of that state
when he filed the action. One cannot reasonably conclude that a
state has an interest in providing forums for its residents only if
the claims arose after the person took up residence in the state.
193. See notes 77 & 84 supra and accompanying text.
194. F. BARRET, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT §§ 33.1-.18
(1978).
195. See 19 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 10481, 10483, 10487 (1946
& Supp. 1979).
196. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 567-69 (1961).
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Although the events engendering the controversy may not have
significantly affected the claimant while he was a resident of the
forum state, a judicial decision concerning those events certainly
will affect him. Therefore, under an interest analysis theory, the
claimant's state of residence at the time that the events engender-
ing the controversy occurred, as well as his state of residence at the
time suit was filed, both possessed an interest in providing a forum
for the resolution of the controversy. 197 Moreover, even though the
plaintiff in Rush moved away from Minnesota before the resolu-
tion of the controversy,198 this fact should not extinguish Minne-
sota's interest in providing a forum. To allow such a result would
discourage the free movement of people from one state to another
and is inimical to the inclusive interest of the collective community
of states in the free flow of goods, services, and people across state
lines. 99
Since Minnesota thus possessed an interest in providing a fo-
rum, the issue under an interest analysis theory would be whether
requiring the injuror to appear in the action in Minnesota would
subject him to an undue burden. Elkhart, Indiana, the injuror's
home, is in northern Indiana, which is not very far from Minne-
sota. In addition, since the injuror's insurance company probably
would bear the costs of litigating the controversy in Minnesota,
plaintiff's forum at most would impose only an inconvenience on
the injuror. Thus, in his dissenting opinion Justice Brennan ob-
served that "the defendant would bear almost no burden or ex-
pense beyond what he would face if the suit were in his home
state."20 Indeed, the defendant insurance company in Rush did
not even contend that it would be unduly burdened by litigating
the case in Minnesota. Thus, the Rush Court could have applied
197. The latter state would possess such an interest because the outcome in the con-
troversy will significantly affect one of its residents.
198. 444 U.S. at 322 n.1.
199. Another policy supports this conclusion: federal courts adhere to the general rule
that diversity jurisdiction is determined at the time the action is commenced, rather than at
the time the claim arose. An interest analysis presumes that a court should determine juris-
diction at the outset of the litigation, and that, once established, jurisdiction should con-
tinue until the final disposition of the case. This presumption provides maximum stability
and certainty in the action and precludes repeated jurisdictional challenges. See 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3608 (1975). As is
true in diversity actions, courts should scrutinize the plaintiff's actions to ensure that he
actually has become a resident of the forum state and is not simply feigning residence to
gain some advantage in the litigation. See 14,id. § 3638 (1976).
200. 444 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissent found at World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 304 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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an interest analysis theory and held that Minnesota possessed the
authority to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.
Minnesota's exercise of jurisdiction would have contravened only
Indiana's equivalent interest in providing a forum for the resolu-
tion of the controversy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in International
Shoe represented a major step forward in the development of judi-
cial jurisdiction doctrines. The Court in that case promulgated
more realistic standards to deal with people's everyday activities
and rejected the territorial dogma of, and fictional exceptions to,
the Pennoyer approach. 20 1 The Court further advanced this en-
lightened trend when it refused in Shaffer to continue varying due
process protections according to whether an action was in rem,
quasi in rem, or in personam.202 Nevertheless, these developments
should constitute only the beginning of the reform that is neces-
sary to make judicial jurisdiction doctrines compatible with both
the everyday activities of people in this country and relevant com-
munity goals and policies.
Since International Shoe, only McGee has suggested that the
Court has been developing and employing doctrines which appro-
priately accommodate the various exclusive and inclusive interests
at stake in judicial jurisdiction controversies. 20 s The other deci-
sions of the Court fail to suggest such a trend largely because the
neo-territorial minimum contacts theory promulgated in Interna-
tional Shoe2 0 4-a theory that Hanson's purposefully availing re-
quirement20 5 made even more territorial-does not consider ade-
quately the different interests that are implicated in these
controversies. Only by abandoning these already obsolete doctrines
can the Court hope to achieve more appropriate results.
The Supreme Court should abandon the minimum contacts
approach because contacts, apart from the interests they engender,
are meaningless occurrences. Rather than totally abandoning the
existing doctrines, however, the Court can shift its emphasis to the
fairness or reasonableness aspects of its doctrines.2 6 The Court
201. See notes 1-25 supra and accompanying text.
202. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
203. See notes 153-56 supra and accompanying text.
204. See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 26-28 & 157-67 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text.
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should not define these amphorous concepts in terms of some
vague notions of natural law or justice; rather, it should define
them in terms of the interests of particular states and the collec-
tive community of states. Only in this manner can the Court en-
sure, to the maximum extent feasible, that its decisions will appro-
priately consider and accommodate the significant exclusive and
inclusive interests at stake in jurisdictional controversies.
To summarize, the exclusive interests that may be at stake in
a jurisdictional controversy include the following: the interest of a
state in providing a forum for the resolution of the controversy
when either the events engendering or the ultimate decision in the
controversy have significantly affected that state's people, re-
sources, or institutions; and the interest of the states in which the
parties reside in protecting their residents from the undue burden
of prosecuting or defending an action in a distant forum.07 The
inclusive interests that may be at stake in these controversies are
as follows: the provision of at least one forum in which a claimant
may timely present his claims against all those who allegedly
caused, are causing, or may cause the claimant to suffer depriva-
tions; the protection of defendants from exposure to multiple lia-
bility for the same resource, debt, or obligation; the achievement of
the greatest possible economy in litigation for both individuals and
states; and the protec tion of parties from the undue burden of
prosecuting or defending an action in a distant forum.208
When these interests conflict with one another, as they are
bound to do, the objective of the courts should be to sustain the
jurisdictional authority of an interested forum unless its exercise of
jurisdiction will unduly frustrate other exclusive and inclusive in-
terests at stake in the controversy. If the plaintiff selects a disin-
terested state in which to file suit, that state should retain the
power to resolve the controversy so long as its exercise of jurisdic-
tion will accommodate most appropriately the conflicting and com-
peting interests. Courts should systematically examine the factors
that indicate both whether an exercise of jurisdiction by an inter-
ested state will unduly frustrate other interests and whether an ex-
ercise of jurisdiction by a disinterested state will accommodate
those interests most appropriately.20 9 Courts can employ this sys-
tematic examination quicker and easier than they now can under
207. See notes 79-85 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 86-105 supra and accompanying text.
209. These statements summarize the systematic interest analysis that was outlined
above. See notes 106-46 supra and accompanying text.
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the amorphous minimum contacts/purposefully availing/fairness
doctrines. In addition, a systematic interest analysis would produce
decisions that better allocate judicial business among the states
and would impose fewer burdens on litigants than the neo-territo-
rial doctrines that the Supreme Court currently employs.

